Jury selection; Excusal of a juror for cause; MCR 2.511(E); Presumption of bias; Familial relationship; MCR 2.511(E)(8); Prosecutorial error; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Trial strategy; Failure to make a futile objection; Prejudice; Cumulative error

The court held that: (1) the trial judge did not err by failing to sua sponte excuse a prospective juror, (2) defendant’s trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to prosecutorial misconduct, and (3) he was not entitled to a new trial. He was convicted of several charges of varying degrees of CSC and indecent exposure for sexually abusing his neighbor, HS, beginning when she was age 8, and culminating with him indecently exposing himself to her when she was 15. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that he was entitled to a new trial because of the trial court’s failure to sua sponte excuse a prospective juror, Juror 170, for cause. Defendant highlighted “remarks made at sentencing to show the trial judge believed that he was guilty. But there [was] nothing to connect Juror 170 to those comments, aside from the acknowledged familial relationship and speculation.” In addition, “during voir dire, Juror 170 expressed, albeit somewhat qualifiedly, that she would be able to render a fair and impartial verdict and follow the trial court’s instructions.” The court also rejected his claim that the prosecutor improperly responded to the theory of the defense in cross-examination, and that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object. “[T]he prosecutor did not commit error or misconduct when asking [defendant] about his failure to mention a corroborating witness before trial.” The court discouraged “prosecutors from asking defendants about matters of trial strategy, including knowledge of the law and criminal procedure, because doing so is outside a defendant’s wheelhouse and could promote the revealing of attorney-client confidences on the record.” But because “the omission of these questions from cross-examination would not have made a difference to” defendant’s case, it found no error affecting his substantial rights. Defense counsel’s “failure to object to the prosecutor’s conduct” was not objectively unreasonable. “And even if it were,” there was “no prejudice.” Finally, the court rejected his contention that “the cumulative effect of errors, i.e., a disqualified juror being impaneled and the prosecutor’s misconduct, denied him a fair trial.” Because he “has not identified any error, let alone several errors, that undermined the reliability of the verdict, there can be no cumulative effect of errors requiring reversal.” Affirmed.