Motion for relief under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f); Motion for reconsideration; Arbitration agreement; Personal injury protection (PIP) benefits

Concluding that “the trial court erred by granting defendant’s motion for relief under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f) and denying plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration[,]” the court reversed and remanded. The case arose out of a motor vehicle accident after which plaintiff sought PIP benefits. He argued “that the trial court abused its discretion in granting defendant’s motion when it concluded that the arbitration judgment was properly entered based on defendant’s version of the arbitration agreement.” The court noted that “the trial court effectively determined the summary disposition issue concerning the validity of the arbitration agreement, which was not at issue in the underlying order or motion to set aside from which defendant sought relief, by finding that ‘judgment was properly entered based on the arbitration agreement signed by all of the parties . . . .’ Though the trial court has the ability to revise its nonfinal orders. . . it erred here by assessing the substantive question of whether the parties had a valid arbitration agreement under the standard set forth in MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f), without analysis of the underlying motions for summary disposition or reconsideration.” The court found that the “trial court applied the wrong legal standard in effectively determining this issue under MCR 2.612(C)(1)(f) without making a record analyzing the . . . facts. Indeed, the extent of the trial court’s analysis in determining that defendant’s version of the agreement controlled was that ‘[t]he existence of a second document, unsigned by [d]efendant, [was] not sufficient to demonstrate the invalidity of the document signed by all parties.’ The trial court should have analyzed this issue in the summary disposition context, construing the evidence in favor of plaintiff and abstaining from making its own factual determinations.” Thus, the court held that “because the trial court applied the wrong standard in granting defendant’s motion for relief on this basis, it abused its discretion.”