Michigan sex offender registry under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA); Determining whether two crimes are substantially similar for SORA purposes; The “categorical approach”; Whether two crimes “correspond”; Full Faith & Credit Clause; “Foreign judgment”; MCL 691.1172; Cruel or unusual punishment; People v Kiczenski; Equal protection; Ex post facto punishment; Vagueness challenge; Fair notice; Due process

Concluding that petitioner’s “release from registry requirements in Iowa” did not come “with a corresponding requirement that [he] be relieved of his registry requirements in Michigan[,]” the court affirmed the trial court’s order denying his “petition to be relieved of the requirement to register” under SORA. Noting that neither it “nor the Michigan Supreme Court have considered what approach should be employed to determine whether an out-of-state conviction is substantially similar to a Michigan offense for” SORA purposes, the court concluded that in “this case, it would lead to an absurd result to enforce a strictly categorical approach for determining what crimes under SORA are substantially similar.” Petitioner first argued that “he was not convicted of a crime that is substantially similar to a Michigan crime.” Thus, he asserted that he was not required to register under MCL 28.722. The court held that “a person such as petitioner who is convicted of lascivious acts with a child under Iowa Code § 709.8 is subject to sex offender registration requirements as a Tier-II offender in Michigan, and the trial court did not err when it determined that Iowa’s statute concerning lascivious acts with a child, Iowa Code § 709.8(3), and Michigan’s accosting a minor for immoral purposes, MCL 750.145a, are substantially similar.” The court next rejected his arguments based on the Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. He contended that, “once the Iowa courts ordered him removed from the Iowa sex offender registry, those constitutional and statutory provisions required that he be removed from the Michigan registry as well.” His argument was unavailing “because the two registration requirements are independent of one another.” His registration requirement in Michigan stemmed “from his Iowa conviction and not his Iowa registration requirement.” Due to his “Iowa conviction, Michigan’s SORA independently requires petitioner to register with the sex offender registry of this state. An Iowa court may not modify the terms or application of Michigan’s SORA through a decision regarding the enforcement of Iowa’s sex offender registry laws.” He next contended “that requiring him to report as a sex offender is excessively harsh considering the gravity of the offense and fails to advance the goals of rehabilitation.” The court held that under Kiczenski, it was “bound to conclude that petitioner’s registration under SORA does not constitute cruel or unusual punishment[.]” Finally, it held that he failed to show “that SORA’s petition process presents an equal-protection violation, and the trial court did not err when it denied [his] request to be removed from SORA’s reporting regime.”