Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to request an involuntary-manslaughter jury instruction; People v Yeager; People v Holtschlag; Keeble v. United States

The court concluded that because defendant “was prejudiced by defense counsel’s failure to request a manslaughter jury instruction, the trial court abused its discretion by denying defendant’s motion for a new trial.” Thus, it vacated her convictions and remanded to the trial court for a new trial. She was convicted of second-degree murder and other charges arising from driving while intoxicated. The court held that “given the defense’s theory of the case, defense counsel’s failure to request a manslaughter instruction ‘fell below an objective standard of professional reasonableness’ and, therefore, constituted deficient performance.” The question turned to whether “counsel’s failure to request the manslaughter instruction prejudiced the defense.” The court noted that “counsel chose to focus on malice as the intent to kill or intent to cause great bodily harm, but ignored the other definition of malice, which focuses on ‘the intent to do an act in wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of such behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm.’” The court found that “defendant’s willful disregard here—in driving while intoxicated at high rates of speed—had the natural tendency to cause death.” Nevertheless, it noted that “counsel continued to inform defendant that the prosecutor could not prove malice.” Counsel’s theory “was that defendant ‘was in fight or flight survival mode’ when she caused the car accident. In other words, defendant acted in fear because” she was being chased. Therefore, “counsel argued the absence of malice to the jury.” Pursuant to Holtschlag, “‘the sole element distinguishing manslaughter and murder is malice.’” The court concluded that failing “to provide a lesser-included offense instruction gives life to precisely what Keeble predicted: ‘Where one of the elements of the offense charged remains in doubt, but the defendant is plainly guilty of some offense, the jury is likely to resolve its doubts in favor of conviction.’” It believed it was “more probable than not that the trial court’s decision that it was harmless error to withhold a manslaughter instruction undermined the verdict’s reliability.”