Dismissal sanction; Trial courts’ inherent authority to sanction litigants & their counsel; Failure to comply with a court order; MCR 2.504(B)(1); Factors for consideration; Gueye v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co; The trial court’s use of its contempt power; MCL 600.1701; Consideration of lesser sanctions; The clean-hands doctrine; Maldonado v Ford Motor Co

Holding that “the trial court did not abuse its discretion or otherwise err” in dismissing plaintiffs’ action, the court affirmed. They argued that it “improperly used its contempt power to enforce a monetary debt that plaintiffs owed to defendants and this is contrary to the typical application of MCL 600.1701(e).” But the court found that this “argument improperly conflates the issues of the initial contempt holding, the implementation of sanctions, and the trial court’s ultimate dismissal of” the case. It determined that, reading “the trial court’s ruling in its proper context, plaintiffs’ argument that the trial court incorrectly applied MCL 600.1701(e) does not support reversal because it does not address the [trial] court’s reasoning for the dismissal.” As to their claim that the trial court did not consider lesser sanctions, it “in fact extensively considered whether lesser sanctions would be appropriate. The trial court expressly stated that whether a lesser sanction would be appropriate was the most important factor for it to consider. It reasoned that it previously had found” plaintiff-Haddad in contempt, “and it determined that an intermediate sanction, such as precluding Haddad from presenting evidence, was not possible.” It concluded there was nothing it could do to get him to comply with its order. It also found that he “simply ignored [its] order instead of requesting relief, such as additional time or a payment schedule.” Considering all the relevant factors, the court held that the trial court’s decision did “not fall outside the range of reasonable outcomes. Throughout this matter, plaintiffs repeatedly failed to comply with, or outright violated, [its] orders. [They] violated an order to not remove specific property, and after the trial court ordered [them] to pay the Gentilozzi defendants to replace the wrongfully removed property, plaintiffs did not take any steps toward payment. In light of [their] repeated violations of the trial court’s orders and the lack of less-serious sanctions available to the [trial] court, it was reasonable for [it] to impose the harsh sanction of dismissal.” Finally, as to the dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims against a defendant “who was a defaulted party at the time of” the ruling, the record did not support their assertion they had no notice that those claims might be dismissed, and the court held “that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when using its inherent authority to sanction plaintiffs for misconduct by dismissing [their] entire case.”