Premises liability; Proximate cause
The court concluded that the trial court erred in denying defendant-apartment complex's (Barrington) “motion for summary disposition because plaintiffs failed to establish that Barrington’s alleged negligence was a proximate cause of their injuries.” The case arose out of an assault on plaintiffs-Briggs and Jenno, that occurred at the apartment complex. The court found that “Barrington met its burden. Barrington presented evidence that entry to the apartment building could occur independent of any alleged breach of its duty to maintain the door locks. Specifically, the assailant could have entered the building by using the door at the same time as somebody else or by buzzing another apartment because each apartment had a buzzer to remotely allow people access inside. Alternatively, multiple people testified the exterior doors at the apartment complex were constantly being propped open. And, although it was possible that the assailant entered by a defective exterior door lock, it was equally as possible as any of Barrington’s proffered theories.” Once it “met its burden, plaintiffs were required to establish a genuine issue of fact existed regarding causation.” In response to Barrington’s motion, “plaintiffs asserted causation was a question for the jury, and argued several factors caused the assaults, stating: ‘[T]he inadequacy of the outside locks, the dangerousness of [the assailant], and the failure to take mandatory actions to ensure that [the assailant] was taking his medications, combined to bring about the tragic result. As such, questions of fact are created as to causation, precluding summary disposition.’” Beyond the “claimed defectiveness of the locks, none of the factors plaintiffs mentioned address[ed] how the assailant entered the building. Plaintiffs speculated he likely entered through the courtyard door because Jenno testified she saw him in the courtyard; however, plaintiffs failed to offer any evidence supporting this theory.” Moreover, according to Jenno, “the courtyard door was propped open nearly every day in the month she lived at the apartment complex and, while it required a push, the courtyard door did lock. Plaintiffs offered no evidence indicating it was more likely the assailant accessed the building because of a defective lock rather than by a propped-open door or by any of Barrington’s alternate theories. Plaintiffs failed to exclude other reasonably possible explanations as to how the assailant accessed the building, and, therefore, failed to establish a question of fact regarding causation.” Reversed and remanded.
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