Defamation; Absolute privilege; Kefgen v. Davidson; Qualified privilege; Smith v Fergen; Tumbarella v Kroger Co; Attorney fees & costs; MCL 600.2911(7); Adherence to the jury’s finding; MCR 2.515(B); Frivolousness; MCL 600.2591; Actual malice; Additur; MCR 2.611

Finding no errors requiring reversal, the court affirmed the trial court’s rulings in this case involving defamation. The parties filed various lawsuits against each other. One party, Dubs, sued another, Bowles, alleging defamation and interference with a business relationship in connection with Bowles’ allegation that Dubs (a teacher and coach at her school) pulled her toward him in a gym and kissed her. He also sued for abuse of process and malicious prosecution in connection with the filing of a police report and a petition for a PPO. And Bowles sued Dubs, alleging assault, as well as abuse of process in connection with the filing of his lawsuit. Bowles also sued Dubs’ girlfriend, defendant-Repkie, alleging defamation and “disclosure of embarrassing private facts” in connection with Repkie’s statements at a school board meeting. And Repkie sued Bowles, alleging her lawsuit amounted to abuse of process and malicious prosecution. The jury found Bowles and her mother, BB, defamed Dubs, and that Repkie defamed Bowles, but rejected the other claims. On appeal, the court rejected Repkie’s argument that the trial court should have granted her summary disposition of Bowles’s defamation claim. “Ultimately, the trial court did not err by finding that a genuine issue of material fact existed for trial. Bowles presented adequate evidence of the elements of defamation. Repkie continually refer[red] to trial testimony in support of her assertion that her statements were substantially true, but the question before the trial court, and before” the court was “whether Bowles presented enough evidence to raise a question of fact at the summary disposition stage. We find that she did.” The court also rejected Bowles’ claim that the trial court should have awarded her attorney fees and costs, and that Dubs’ defamation theory was legally deficient. “The trial court did not err by adhering to the jury’s precise finding regarding attorney fees and other damages, as MCR 2.515(B) required it to do so.” The trial court “explained that the litigation had been extensive and contentious from all sides, and it decided that costs would not be awarded in either lower court docket number.” This was not an abuse of discretion. Further, Dubs’ “allegation of defamation per se was legally adequate.” Finally, the court rejected Dubs’ contention that the trial court erred by denying his motion for additur or a new trial on damages, noting: 1) Bowles’s attorney cross-examined Dubs’ online reputation expert (C) and did not simply accept the testimony at face value, 2) the jurors were free to disbelieve C, 3) the jurors knew they were finding in Dubs’ favor on the defamation claim and may have inferred this finding would make its way online, and 4) there was “no evidence that the jury’s verdict on the additur issue was motivated by passion or prejudice.”