Right to a unanimous verdict; Specific unanimity instruction; People v Cooks; The collision element of third-degree fleeing & eluding; People v Feezel; Causation; Waiver; People v Spaulding; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Deficiency & prejudice; Trial strategy; Judicial bias; MCL 2.003(C)(1); People v McDonald; Presumption of judicial impartiality; People v Jackson; Whether a judge’s conduct pierces the veil of judicial impartiality; People v Stevens; Judicial questioning of witnesses; MRE 614(b); Right to present a complete defense; People v Aspy; Hearsay; Waiver of counsel at sentencing; MCR 6.005(D)

Finding no errors requiring reversal, the court affirmed defendant’s convictions. However, because of a defective waiver of counsel it vacated his sentences and remanded for resentencing. He was convicted of third-degree fleeing and eluding, operating a vehicle without security, operating a vehicle without registration, and assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer, for leading police on a chase. The prosecution claimed there were two collisions resulting from the chase – one when defendant struck a tree and a second when two other vehicles were involved in an accident. On appeal, the court agreed with defendant that he was entitled to a specific unanimity instruction because the prosecution presented two different collisions to satisfy the sixth element of third-degree fleeing and eluding. “[M]aterially distinguishable evidence was required to establish each collision.” However, defendant waived this “argument because defense counsel expressly stated she had no objections to the jury instructions.” And although counsel’s performance was defective, it “did not result in prejudice due to the high-confidence evidence that [defendant] caused the second wreck.” The court next rejected his argument that the trial judge was biased and lacked impartiality because he appeared to favor the prosecutor during voir dire and throughout trial. It found he “did not overcome his burden of establishing the trial judge was biased or lacked impartiality.” Defendant failed to show that “the trial judge’s comments regarding defense counsel being new to the area, and the prosecutor being known at church, unduly influenced the jury.” And although “the trial judge’s guiding the attorneys was unorthodox, it did not pierce the veil of impartiality because his conduct was directed at both parties.” The court also rejected defendant’s claim that the trial court prevented him from presenting a complete defense because it did not permit him to relate the identity of his kidnapper, noting the trial court’s exclusion of the assailant’s name as inadmissible hearsay was not erroneous. Finally, the court agreed with defendant that he was entitled to resentencing because the trial court failed to comply with the basic requirements for waiver at his sentencing hearing. It noted the trial court erred “because it did not consider the additional factors required under MCR 6.005(D).”