Petition to admit an amendment to a trust; The proper statutory legal standard in determining the validity of a trust amendment; Amending a revocable trust; MCL 700.7602(3)(a); Burden of proof; Preponderance of the evidence; Credibility determinations; Factual determinations; Distinguishing In re Guardianship of Gerstler; Reliance on MCL 700.7402(1) & 700.3407(1)(b)

Holding that the probate court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that a trust amendment was invalid, the court affirmed its order denying appellant-Goines’s petition to admit the amendment. The case concerned a family trust created by the decedent (Jerry W. Tippett) and his wife. The first amendment to the trust named their son (Jerry D.) as the beneficiary and first successor trustee, and decedent’s friend (L) as the alternate beneficiary and successor trustee. The second amendment reaffirmed this. Both were prepared by attorneys. “Goines and Jerry D. became engaged” and lived at the decedent’s home. Jerry D. passed away shortly before the decedent. The third amendment presented by Goines named her as the successor trustee. “No attorney was listed on the document.” Goines argued “the probate court failed to apply the proper statutory legal standard in determining the validity of the third amendment.” But she offered no evidence that it “incorrectly applied the preponderance of the evidence standard beyond her disagreement with” its decision. She seemed to assert that because it “did not explicitly state the standard, it failed to apply one. Given that that standard of proof was undisputed, we cannot conclude that the probate court’s failure to explicitly state the standard of proof was ‘outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.’” As to applying the standard, the “probate court expressly weighed the evidence and testimony, found that” the testimony of L and a forensic handwriting expert (H) “had more convincing force, and concluded that the third amendment was invalid. [Its] conclusion was based on [H’s] opinion that ‘with the highest degree of probability,’ the signature on the third amendment was not written by decedent.” It also questioned the credibility of one of Goines’s witnesses “based on her failure to notice (1) a glaring error in the notary block on the third amendment and (2) the untruthful statement in her declaration that she was still a notary.” And it questioned the credibility of Goines and her witnesses who “testified that the business relationship between decedent and [L] had ended. [It] found that ‘[t]he testimony . . . was clear that there’s [sic] still exist some business relationships.’” The court concluded “Goines’s arguments amount to an attack on the probate court’s credibility determinations” and noted that it defers to the probate court on those matters. It was “not definitely and firmly convinced that a mistake has been made.”