“Compassionate release”; 18 USC § 3582(c)(1)(A); Whether the Sentencing Commission had the authority to issue policy statement USSG § 1B1.13(b)(6); The separation of powers; “Extraordinary & compelling reasons” for relief under § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A)-(D); Effect of a nonretroactive change in the law; United States v McCall; Whether the Commission has the authority to overrule a court’s interpretation of the Commission’s authority; Neal v United States; Whether the Commission can interpret § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) to allow a court to reduce a sentence below the statutory mandatory minimum portion of the sentence

The court concluded that the Sentencing Commission exceeded its authority when it issued USSG § 1B1.13(b)(6), a “policy statement” about the compassionate release sentencing statute, where the policy statement was “unreasonable under the statute” and conflicted with the separation of powers. Thus, it held that “§ 1B1.13(b)(6) is invalid.” Defendants-Bricker, McKenry, and Orta sought compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A), after the Sentencing Commission issued § 1B1.13(b)(6), a policy statement that would enable “old-timer” prisoners to obtain early release under the statute. In § 1B1.13(b)(6), “the Sentencing Commission announced that a nonretroactive change in the law can present an ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reason warranting a sentence reduction if (1) a prisoner has served at least 10 years (2) of ‘an unusually long sentence,’ (3) there is a ‘gross disparity’ between the actual sentence being served and a hypothetical sentence that would apply under the current law if any nonretroactive changes in the law since the original sentencing were given retroactive effect, and (4) the sentencing court has fully considered ‘the defendant’s individualized circumstances.’” The court noted that in McCall, “the full Sixth Circuit concluded: ‘Nonretroactive legal developments do not factor into the extraordinary and compelling analysis. Full stop.’” But within months, the Sentencing Commission promulgated the policy statement in § 1B1.13(b)(6). The court held that the Commission could not overrule the Sixth Circuit’s “holding by issuing a ‘policy statement’ that re-interprets” the statute. Under Neal, “once a court has interpreted the bounds of the Commission’s delegated authority as we did in McCall, the Commission does not have the authority to overrule that interpretation.” The court also addressed whether the Commission can “interpret § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) to empower a court to reduce a sentence below the statutory mandatory minimum portion of the sentence[.]” It concluded that “§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)—which says nothing at all about statutory mandatory minimums—could never empower a court to reduce a sentence below the statutory minimum portion of that sentence.” Because the court declared § 1B1.13(b)(6) invalid, it reversed in Bricker’s case and affirmed in McHenry and Orta’s cases, denying compassionate release for all three defendants.