Whether defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial was violated; Barker v Wingo; Length of the delay; Responsibility for the delays; Assertion of the right to a speedy trial; United States v Williams; United States v Allen; Whether defendant was prejudiced by the delays

The court held that “under the totality of the circumstances,” defendant-Schuster was not denied his right to a speedy trial where he was more to blame for the overall trial delay, he “failed to sincerely assert his right to a speedy trial in a timely manner,” and he did not show prejudice resulting from the delay. He moved to dismiss three felony child pornography charges that he had been indicted for six years prior, alleging a violation of the right to a speedy trial. After initially denying the motion, the district court reconsidered and dismissed the charges. Applying the Barker factors, the court held that although the district court was responsible for some of the delay, “Schuster is more to blame for the overall delay. Perhaps most importantly, [he] failed to sincerely assert his right to a speedy trial in a timely manner[.]” The parties disputed who was “properly assigned responsibility for the periods of delay in which” Schuster had motions “pending before the district court without action. In [his] view, nearly all of the delay is attributable to the government. And in the government’s view, nearly all of the delay is attributable to Schuster. Both views miss the mark.” The court found that the question was “whether the time taken to adjudicate pretrial motions is reasonable or justified.” It noted that its precedent did “not provide clear guidance for evaluating when a district court unreasonably delays in its adjudication of pretrial motions.” As to one of the periods at issue, the “district court explained that the main driver of its delay was its desire to await the outcome of several Sixth Circuit cases that may have shed light on Schuster’s [10/18] motions.” The court found that while “waiting for some other court to act may be unreasonable in other speedy-trial cases, the record here demonstrates that Schuster was complicit in this delay. Whether or not the district court’s decision to await the Sixth Circuit cases was reasonable, Schuster did not object to the delay and indeed acquiesced. Worse still, he may have been at fault for part of” it. The court concluded that his “litigation conduct over the entire case indicate[d] that he ‘did not want a speedy trial.’” It rejected his reliance on his lengthy incarceration, especially during the pandemic, to support a finding of prejudice, holding that through “his substantial contributions to the delay, Schuster himself precipitated much of the general harm coming from his pretrial detention.” Further, his “threadbare assertions of his right to a speedy trial also undermine his prejudice claim.” Reversed and remanded.