Jurisdiction under MCR 7.203(A); “Aggrieved party”; In re Jackson/Jenkins/Jones (Unpub); Whether the release of parental rights was knowing or voluntary; Lawyer-guardian ad litem (LGAL); Advice of rights under MCR 3.971(B); Prejudice

The court concluded “that when a parent challenges the validity of a release of parental rights on the ground that it was not made knowingly or voluntarily, the parent alleges a concrete injury arising from the trial court’s order and qualifies as an aggrieved party for purposes of appellate jurisdiction.” It affirmed the trial court’s order finding respondent-mother’s release was both knowing and voluntary, and terminating her parental rights. The DHHS argued the court lacked “jurisdiction to consider the appeal because [she] consented to termination and [was] therefore not an ‘aggrieved party’ under MCR 7.203(A).” She countered that she was aggrieved because her release was not knowing or voluntary. The jurisdictional question was whether her voluntary release operated as a consent judgment that precluded her from being “aggrieved.” The court found Jackson/Jenkins/Jones persuasive and concluded “that, in a termination of parental rights proceeding, a respondent who released their parental rights is an aggrieved party under MCR 7.203(A) when challenging the validity of the release itself.” It found that “even if an order terminating parental rights based on a release is analogous to a consent judgment, it does not necessarily follow that respondent is precluded from appealing from it. Because the termination here was based on a release respondent now claims was defective,” the court rejected the DHHS’s argument that the release deprived it of jurisdiction. She contended the trial court erred in accepting her release because it was not knowing or voluntary. The court found the release left “little room for second-guessing” as it expressly stated she made “a considered decision that termination was in her children’s best interests and” did not contest it. At the adjudication trial, respondent confirmed that the release was “a correct statement.” The trial court conducted a colloquy to ensure she “understood the consequences of the release, including that she would lose the ability to make decisions regarding her children’s healthcare, education, or daily life, and that the children would be placed for adoption. Both respondent’s counsel” and LGAL confirmed she “knowingly and voluntarily executed the release and had the opportunity to consult with counsel about its impact. [She] also requested a final goodbye visit with her children, which the [trial] court granted, and she was advised of her appellate rights.” The court concluded that nothing suggested “the release resulted from misunderstanding, intimidation, coercion, or deception.” Instead, it “was the product of respondent’s free, deliberate, and informed choice.” On appeal, she claimed her “release was invalid because the trial court did not advise her of the rights set forth in MCR 3.971(B), which outlines admonitions a court must provide before accepting a plea of admission or no contest to statutory grounds for termination. However, those warnings apply when a respondent admits to statutory grounds at the adjudication phase of the proceedings.” Because her “release was not a plea, the trial court was not required to provide the” advisements. Even if it erred in accepting her release, she could not show prejudice.