Attorney fees for a prevailing social security claimant; 42 USC § 406(b); Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA); 28 USC § 2412; Contingency-fee agreements for § 406(b) fee awards; Gisbrecht v Barnhart; Rodriquez v Bowen; The reasonableness analysis; Treating the effective hourly rate as a primary focus; Standard rate analysis; Hayes v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs

The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by reducing plaintiff’s counsel’s attorney-fee award in this social security disability benefits case where it reasonably considered both the $125 EAJA rate and counsel’s ordinary rate in its standard rate analysis. The district court reversed the administrative decision denying plaintiff benefits and ordered the case remanded for further administrative proceedings. It awarded her counsel $7,500 in attorney’s fees under the EAJA, pending a final decision or award. Plaintiff had a contingency agreement with counsel for 25% of any past-due benefit award, the maximum percentage allowed under § 406(b). When she was finally granted benefits, her past-due benefits totaled $124,821.70. Counsel moved for the $31,205.43 in fees, less the initial $7,500 award, but the district court awarded her $17,400. The court explained that it had little occasion to consider contingency-fee agreements for § 406(b) fee awards since the Supreme Court issued Gisbrecht, which held that contingency-fee agreements within the 25% “cap are ‘not to be viewed as per se reasonable.’” Rather, the court affords such agreements a “rebuttable presumption,” under which “the contingency-fee agreement is the ‘starting point for the court’s analysis’ and courts must ‘give [such agreements] close attention’ and ‘due deference.’” In Hayes, the court held that if “a ‘calculated hourly rate (i.e., effective rate) is ‘less than twice the standard rate for such work in the relevant market,’ then it is ‘per se reasonable.’” However, if it “is equal to or more than ‘twice the standard rate,’ ‘then the court may consider arguments designed to rebut the presumed reasonableness of the attorney’s fee.’” Counsel argued “the district court’s ‘primary focus’ was on the effective hourly rate under the lodestar method, contravening Gisbrecht’s instruction to look first to the contingency agreement, then test it for reasonableness.” The court disagreed. The district court took the $31,205.43 requested award, divided it by the 34.8 hours worked, and arrived at “an effective hourly rate of $896.71, which it found excessive relative to the statutory rate in the EAJA as well as Counsel’s ordinary rate.” In addition, it “considered other factors, like the complexity of the case, counsel-induced delay, and the fact that the remand stemmed from the Commissioner’s unopposed motion for remand, in finding that the requested fee award would constitute a windfall.” The district court “acknowledged Counsel’s skill and expertise but reasonably concluded that the case did not reach a level of complexity or effort that merited the maximum award.” Affirmed.