Attempt to remove a candidate from the ballot in the 8/24 primary election; Michigan Campaign Finance Act (MCFA); MCL 169.215(1); Affidavit of identity (AOI); MCL 168.558(1), (2), & (4); Whether plaintiff’s claim for declaratory relief actually sounded in mandamus; Requirements to obtain mandamus relief; Mootness; Exception for issues of public significance that are likely to recur but evade judicial review; Davis v Secretary of State; Due process; Time limitations for a response to a summary disposition motion; Prejudice; Court of Claims (COC)

Concluding this case was similar to Davis, the court addressed the merits of the underlying issue related to removal of a candidate from the 8/24 primary ballot, although it was moot as a practical matter. It found that the COC was correct that plaintiff-Charette’s claim for declaratory relief sounded in mandamus and “that he was not entitled to mandamus relief.” Thus, the court affirmed summary disposition for defendant on plaintiff’s claims that defendant wrongfully failed to remove the name of a competing candidate (S) for state representative from the ballot. This case was “similar to Davis in two respects. First, as in Davis, this case is moot. The relief Charette seeks (or sought) relates to an election that has already occurred.” Thus, the court could not grant relief. “Second, like Davis, the issue is likely to reoccur without redress.” So it exercised its “discretion to address the merits of the underlying issue.” Plaintiff argued the COC “improperly treated his complaint as if he were seeking mandamus rather than a declaratory judgment.” The court found no merit in this because the COC “properly considered the substance of Charette’s claim, which sounded in mandamus.” Because plaintiff’s “action sought to compel action by election officials, the gravamen of his claim sounded in mandamus, and the [COC] did not err by considering his claim in that context despite the label that he chose to give it.” Further, it “properly denied his requested relief for at least two reasons: (1) the lack of a legal right to remove [S] from the ballot, and (2) the lack of a clear legal duty on the behalf of defendant to do the same.” While plaintiff relied on the MCFA “to satisfy the legal right and legal duty elements of mandamus[,]” the court found this “reliance was misplaced.” Reviewing the relevant statutes, it concluded that they “create a clear legal duty that a county must not certify the name of a candidate who has failed to submit a sufficient” AOI. But plaintiff did not establish that they “establish a clear legal duty on the part of defendant regarding the certification of candidates. Defendant has only the statutory duty to issue declaratory rulings to implement the MCFA, . . . and the Bureau of Elections responded to Charette’s complaint. Because defendant does not have a clear legal duty to remove [S] from the ballot” based on an allegedly deficient AOI, Charette’s claim against defendant was “clearly unenforceable as a matter of law.”