Prosecutorial error; Referring to the complainant as “the victim”; People v Wisniewski; Sufficiency of the evidence; CSC III; MCL 750.520d(1)(b); “Force or coercion”; MCL 750.520b(1)(f)(i); “Sexual penetration”; MCL 750.520a(r); CSC IV; MCL 750.520e(1)(b); “Sexual contact”; MCL 750.520a(q); Corroboration

The court held that the prosecutor did not commit error by referring to the complainant (HW) as “the victim,” and the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s convictions of CSC III and IV and attempted CSC IV. His convictions arose out of his sexual assault of HW, who was 16 at the time. In a prior appeal, the court vacated his convictions based on “defense counsel’s failure to object to the improperly admitted evidence of defendant’s prior convictions.” At the second trial, the prosecutor referred to HW as the “victim” during jury selection, opening statement, witness testimony, and closing argument. Defense counsel did not object, and indicated he was satisfied with the jury instructions, which included the standard instruction that the attorneys’ questions and statements were not evidence. The jury convicted defendant of all counts. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that the prosecutor denied him a fair trial by repeatedly referring to HW as “the victim.” It noted in Wisniewski that “‘no published Michigan decision or other authority of which we are aware precludes the prosecution from referring to the complainant as ‘the victim.’” The court also rejected his claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions. “[I]t was not improper for the jury to find that HW’s testimony alone was sufficient to demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed these offenses.” First, there “was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant used force to commit penetration.” Next, considering “all of the evidence of defendant complimenting HW’s appearance, going inside the house after her, and the actions he took toward her on the couch, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that this was done for a sexual purpose.” HW’s testimony about him “pinning her wrists above her head when he made this sexual contact constituted force to support the charge.” Finally, while defendant “did not make a direct argument about his attempted CSC IV conviction, HW’s testimony that [he] attempted to force her to touch his penis constituted sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find” him guilty. “There was conflicting evidence from various witnesses at trial, but it was the role of the jury to hear that evidence and make its findings of fact.” Affirmed.