Search & seizure; Motion to suppress evidence; Whether the search warrant affidavit provided sufficient “probable cause”; Nexus; Failure to specify that defendant lived at the address to be searched; Constitutionality of an “unsigned warrant”; United States v Beals; United States v Lyons (1st Cir)

[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court held that it was unnecessary for the warrant affidavit to contain a specific sentence stating that defendant-Whiteside lived at the searched address. Under the totality of the circumstances, there was a “substantial basis” to support a magistrate’s finding of probable cause. And for the first time in this circuit, the court held “that the Fourth Amendment’s text does not require a signature for a warrant to be issued.” Whiteside was charged with FIP after a search of his residence for evidence related to stalking charges. He moved to suppress the firearm evidence arguing that the warrant was invalid because the issuing judge only signed the affidavit, not the warrant itself. At the motion hearing, his attorney “also argued that the affidavit did not include facts that showed a nexus between the criminal activity and Whiteside’s residence.” The district court denied the motion and Whiteside pled guilty, reserving the right to appeal the motion denial. The court first rejected his argument that the affidavit lacked probable cause. The warrant sought evidence of stalking, specifically including electronic media storing data or images, computer devices, and mail or other documents showing Whiteside’s residence/ownership of the apartment. Although the affidavit did not specifically state that he lived at the search address, it contained evidence from the victim that “pointed directly to why this evidence existed at Whiteside’s home[.]” It detailed evidence of the creation of a DVD and other explicit imagery that could be connected to his electronics. The court held that there “was plainly a nexus here[.]” As to his argument the affidavit did not show that the apartment was his residence, while it did not explicitly say that it was, “the totality of the information presented—particularly the details of Detective [M’s] investigation—support the reasonable inference that it was Whiteside’s residence.” He also argued that the unsigned warrant was invalid. He attempted to read Beals “to say an unsigned warrant cannot be issued as a matter of law. But Beals does not require such an unequivocal rule.” And the court noted that such “a per se rule would put our court out of step with every other circuit to consider the question.” Rather, it agreed with the other circuits that have considered the issue. As the First Circuit explained in Lyons, once the “probable cause determination has been made, there is ‘no convincing reason to find implicit in the Fourth Amendment a constitutional mandate that the magistrate who has made a probable cause determination also sign the warrant.’” Affirmed.