Enhanced sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA); 18 USC § 924(e)(1); “Separate occasions” determination; Erlinger v United States; Wooden v United States; Harmless error analysis; Sentence exceeding the statutory maximum; Whether double jeopardy barred the government from seeking an ACCA enhancement based on defendant’s § 922(g)(1) offense for FIP

The court held that a jury, rather than the district court, should have determined whether defendant-Kimbrough had the three previous convictions necessary to support an enhancement under the ACCA. Further, the error was not harmless where there was “reasonable doubt about whether a rational jury, properly instructed under Wooden and Erlinger, would have found that Kimbrough committed the two 2016 burglaries in question on different occasions[.]” Further, resentencing was required because his sentence was impacted by the ACCA enhancement. In 2022, he pled guilty to four counts involving carjacking and firearms. The district court determined that Kimbrough had committed three prior violent felonies on different occasions and enhanced his sentence as an “armed career criminal” under the ACCA. In 2024, the Supreme Court issued Erlinger, which held “that error occurs when a judge, instead of a jury, makes the ‘occasions’ decision.” Thus, the court here had to determine whether the district court’s error was harmless. To show that it was, “the government must prove ‘beyond a reasonable doubt—through relevant and reliable information in the record—that, absent the error, any reasonable jury would have found that [Kimbrough] committed the prior offenses on different occasions.’” The court’s focus was on whether his “two 2016 aggravated burglaries took place on different occasions. Under Wooden, we must look at the timing, the proximity of location, and the character and relationship of these offenses.” It held that “[a] jury could reasonably find that the two burglaries in 2016 were part of a single ‘criminal event.’” They were committed within roughly 2.3 miles of each other. The “facts could lead a reasonable jury to conclude that [they] were committed by the same individuals, using the same modus operandi[.]” As to timing, even if they “were committed nine days apart, that would not necessarily establish beyond a reasonable doubt that they constituted ‘separate occasions.’” The error was not harmless. As to the impact on his sentence, the statutory maximum for Count Four (FIP) was 120 months but the district court sentenced him to 148 months on each count, to be served concurrently. If the ACCA enhancement had not been imposed, “the Guidelines range for this group of counts would have been 84–105 months.” Thus, the enhancement raised his sentence for FIP over the statutory maximum. Resentencing was also required because his sentence for Count One exceeded the 60-month statutory maximum. The court vacated his sentence on Counts One, Two, and Four, and remanded.