Whether plaintiff was erroneously deprived of a bench trial; Claim for declaratory relief; Principle that a request for declaratory relief is not an independent cause of action; Interpretation of a deed restriction; Ambiguous contractual language as a question of fact for a jury; Motion for a new trial; Great weight of the evidence; Enforcing deed restrictions; Thiel v Goyings

The court held that the trial court did not (1) err in denying plaintiff-A2C2’s request for a bench trial or (2) abuse its discretion in denying A2C2’s motion for a new trial on the ground “that the jury verdict was against the great weight of the evidence.” Thus, the court affirmed the “judgment effectuating the jury verdict that A2C2 was prohibited from developing” lots (the Golf Lots) within a subdivision for residential use. A2C2 argued the trial court erred in depriving “it of a bench trial because its claim for declaratory relief was equitable in nature.” It sought a declaratory judgment that the lots “could be used for residential purposes under” a 1975 restriction agreement. But “a request for declaratory relief is not an independent cause of action.” Underlying the request here was interpretation of the 1975 Agreement, which was grounded in contract. Ambiguous “‘contractual language presents a question of fact to be decided by a jury.’” In a prior appeal, the court “concluded that the 1975 Agreement was ambiguous because of its internal inconsistencies.” Thus, the proper construction of the Agreement was “a question of fact to be decided by a jury.” Given that defendant-Association “timely demanded a trial by jury as permitted by MCR 2.508(B), the trial court did not err by denying A2C2’s request for a bench trial.” As to the great weight of the evidence argument, during trial the parties presented evidence including a prior agreement (the 1957 Agreement), “the 1975 Agreement, the Association’s annual meeting minutes prior to its adoption of the 1975 Agreement,” and testimony from two witnesses. The “1975 Agreement differed from the 1957 Agreement in that it omitted the provision affording owners of the lots within the Subdivision an option to purchase the Golf Lots and stating that if they failed to exercise their option, ‘said golf lots may be employed for residence purposes.’ Despite this distinction, the 1975 Agreement retained language that appeared to contemplate the residential development of the Golf Lots.” Because the extrinsic evidence presented by the witnesses’ testimony “conflicted with the portion of the 1975 Agreement that appeared to contemplate the residential development of the” lots, the evidence did not preponderate “‘so heavily against the verdict that it would be a miscarriage of justice to allow it to stand.’” Finally, the state’s “public policy favoring the free use of property does not itself render the jury verdict contrary to law.”