Quiet title; Redemption; Requests for admission deemed admitted; MCR 2.312(B)(1); Motion for reconsideration

The court held that given “plaintiff’s admissions and the email exchange between the parties’ attorneys in which it is apparent that [it] did not tender payment within the redemption period, the circuit court correctly determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact on that issue. Plaintiff also failed to establish any question of fact that defendant had any obligation thereafter, contractual or otherwise, to permit [it] to redeem the properties, or that plaintiff ever actually attempted to tender payment to defendant at any time.” Finally, it found no merit in plaintiff’s claim the circuit court failed to consider its response in denying its motion for reconsideration. The cases involved two actions to quiet title. Plaintiff argued “that it offered to tender the payment to defendant during the redemption period and that after the redemption period, defendant agreed to accept payment.” Thus, plaintiff contended a question of fact existed “whether defendant is contractually obligated to permit [it] to redeem the property.” Defendant claimed “that plaintiff did not attempt to redeem the property within the redemption period, and that despite sending photos of checks that ostensibly would redeem the properties from forfeiture if tendered, plaintiff never presented the checks to defendant.” Defendant supported this claim, “in part, with proof of an email exchange between defense counsel and plaintiff’s then-counsel.” The court concluded that the record supported “the circuit court’s orders granting defendant summary disposition.” Contrary to plaintiff’s claim, there was no evidence that it “tendered payment to defendant to redeem the properties within the redemption period.” The emails showed “that plaintiff’s counsel contacted defendant’s counsel on [3/6/20], the last day of the redemption period, suggesting a meeting the following week to convey the checks to defendant, after the close of the redemption period. The meeting apparently never occurred, and plaintiff does not contend that it ever tendered the payment to defendant.” This was confirmed by subsequent emails “in which plaintiff’s counsel each time offers that plaintiff could pay for the two properties either within 30 days or in 30 days. Defense counsel responded . . . asking where the checks are that plaintiff proposed to use to pay defendant.” As to plaintiff’s reliance on the affidavit of its former counsel, it did “not establish that plaintiff tendered the payment to defendant during the redemption period; rather, [it] states that plaintiff’s counsel ‘tried to arrange’ to redeem the property.” Affirmed.