Retaliation action under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA); MCL 37.2701(a); Meyer v Center Line; Burlington N & Santa Fe Ry Co v White; Causation; Barrett v Kirtland Cmty Coll; Res judicata; Washington v Sinai Hosp of Greater Detroit; Whether an action was decided on the merits; Privity; Peterson Novelties, Inc v Berkley; “Employer” under the ELCRA; MCL 37.2201(a); The “transactional test”; Garrett v Washington; Collateral estoppel; Mecosta Cnty Med Ctr v Metro Group Prop & Cas Ins Co; Consolidation; MCR 2.505(A)

Holding that plaintiff-employee identified no error requiring reversal, the court affirmed the trial court’s order granting summary disposition for defendants-employers. Plaintiff sued defendants for retaliation under Title VII, alleging she engaged in protected activity by complaining about defendant-company’s unfair treatment of Black employees and by lodging a complaint of racial discrimination against a fellow employee at a meeting. She also alleged retaliation in violation of the ELCRA, asserting “that she engaged in protected activity by filing” a prior case, “that defendants knew about that lawsuit, and [they] subjected her to an adverse employment action by dissolving her position, demoting her, and refusing to transfer her to a purchase mortgage team.” On appeal, the court rejected her argument that the trial court erred by ruling in favor of defendants because summary disposition was premature, its analysis as to her transfer to a new role was flawed, and it exhibited favoritism toward defendants by accepting their statements as evidence. First, “plaintiff was reassigned to a new role because of departmental restructuring.” And she failed to show “her decision to choose the position in the refinance team was a demotion.” In addition, defendants’ “refusal to transfer her from the refinance team to a purchase mortgage team is not an adverse employment action because plaintiff is not entitled to her preferred role.” She also did not “show a causal nexus between her protected activity and the alleged adverse employment action.” Second, summary disposition would have also been proper because of the prior final judgment in the first lawsuit. That lawsuit was decided on the merits, there was privity among defendants, and “the matter in the second lawsuit was or could have been resolved in the first lawsuit because they arose from the same operative facts.” Moreover, the “specific factual issue of whether defendants retaliated against her by transferring her to the refinance team was barred by collateral estoppel.” Third, the trial court “did not issue inconsistent rulings by dismissing the second lawsuit” instead of consolidating them.