Prosecutorial vouching; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object to the prosecution’s statements during closing argument; Jury instructions & verdict form; Mandatory minimum sentence; Proportionality; Cruel & unusual punishments; Separation of powers

The court held that “the prosecution did not commit error when making references to [victim] SH’s courage.” Also, the trial court did not plainly err as to the jury instructions or verdict form. Further, because defendant was convicted of CSC I “pursuant to MCL 750.520b(2)(b), his 25-year mandatory minimum sentence did not constitute a departure from the guidelines,” and was presumptively proportional. Additionally, he failed to establish prejudicial plain error on the grounds that this sentence violated the United States or Michigan Constitutions. Finally, he failed “to establish prejudicial plain error on the grounds that MCL 750.520b(2)(b)’s 25-year mandatory minimum sentence violates the separation-of-powers doctrine under the Michigan Constitution.” He was convicted of CSC I and II, and accosting a child for immoral purposes. He was sentenced to 25 to 40 years for each of the CSC I convictions, 10 to 15 years for the CSC II conviction, and 2 to 4 years for the accosting conviction. The case arose out of his “sexual abuse of SH when she was between the ages of four and eight years old.” Defendant argued, among other things, “that he was denied a fair trial when the prosecution improperly vouched for the credibility of SH during closing arguments, and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecution’s statements.” During closing arguments, “the prosecution emphasized that SH was courageous for disclosing defendant’s sexual abuse and standing up for herself. Contrary to defendant’s characterization of the prosecution arguing that ‘SH was a courageous truth[-]telling witness,’ none of the prosecution’s statements referenced SH’s credibility or suggested that the prosecution had special knowledge concerning SH’s truthfulness.” Thus, the prosecution’s references to her “courage did not amount to improper vouching.” The court concluded that even if the “references could be characterized as bolstering SH’s credibility, the prosecution is permitted to do so by arguing from the evidence and reasonable inferences from it.” The court found that the “prosecution’s statements that SH was courageous can be reasonably inferred from evidence that SH initially did not disclose the abuse because she was afraid of getting in trouble, but realized that defendant’s behavior was inappropriate after growing older. This eventually led SH to disclose the abuse to her grandmother when she felt the time was right.” Further, the court found that “any purported impermissible vouching was cured by the trial court’s instruction to the jury that the lawyers’ commentary and arguments were not evidence, and that it was the responsibility of the jury to ‘decide which witnesses [it] believe[s] and how important [it] think[s] their testimony is.’” Affirmed.