Legal malpractice; Coleman v Gurwin; Duty; Simko v Blake; The “suit within a suit” concept; Charles Reinhart Co v Winiemko

The court held that the trial court properly found that defendant failed to establish a genuine question of material fact to support his legal malpractice counterclaim, and did not err by granting third-party defendant-attorney’s (Silverman) motion for summary disposition and dismissing the case. Plaintiff-law firm represented defendant in his divorce case. Following the divorce, the firm sued defendant for payment of legal fees. Defendant filed a counterclaim and third-party complaint against the attorney for legal malpractice. On appeal, the court noted that defendant “did not address in his response to Silverman’s motion for summary disposition how he would have received a more favorable outcome in the divorce case had” she deposed his ex-wife. Next, he “did not demonstrate a genuine question of material fact about the existence of any damages” resulting from the attorney’s recording of a quitclaim deed or failure to move the trial court as to his retrieving personal property. Further, he failed to show that any error she committed by not obtaining an appraisal of his horses was a “proximate cause of any damages.” As to his claims that she “failed to formulate a proper trial strategy to demonstrate to the trial court that his disability made him vulnerable to” his ex-wife’s manipulation and control, the fact that another attorney may have questioned his mental health professionals differently did not raise a genuine question of fact to sustain his claims. Further, he failed to provide any support for his claim that the attorney refused to file for an annulment. Finally, the court noted that the trial court addressed the properly pleaded counts in defendant’s most recent counter-complaint. To the extent that he now argued “for the first time on appeal that there are additional claims nested within Count IX, such haphazard allegations within unrelated counts do not meet this judiciary’s pleading standards. Even setting the pleading standards aside, the allegations found in Count IX are largely, if not wholly, duplicative of allegations found in Counts I through VIII, which the trial court properly addressed.” Affirmed.