Motion in limine as to references to complainants as victims; People v Wisniewski; “Victim” as defined in the CSC context (MCL 750.520a(s)) & in the Crime Victim’s Rights Act (CVRA) (MCL 780.752(1)(m)(i)); A defendant’s presumption of innocence; Other acts evidence; MCL 768.27b(1); Limits on cross-examination; Relevance; MRE 401; Exclusion under MRE 403; Harmless error; MCL 769.26

The court held that the trial court did not (1) abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s motion in limine to preclude references to two complainants as “victims” or (2) err in limiting his cross-examination regarding other acts evidence. Thus, it affirmed his convictions of discharging a firearm in or at a building causing injury and felony-firearm. The case arose from the shooting of his former girlfriend, C, and her friend K. As to the trial court allowing references to them as victims, the court in Wisniewski “recently recognized that ‘no published Michigan decision or other authority . . . precludes the prosecution from referring to’” a complainant as a victim. The court noted here that unlike “cases involving CSC charges, the CVRA does not acknowledge that the term victim applies to an individual making allegations. Instead, it applies to an individual who suffered from the commission of a crime, which the statute also notes, happens ‘upon conviction.’” The court further noted “that such references to complainants as victims prior to a finding of guilt potentially implicates a defendant’s presumption of innocence. The trial court noted the potential impact on defendant’s presumption of innocence when it denied [his] motion, and stated it would instruct the jury accordingly, which it subsequently did. In addition to this instruction, [it] also instructed the jury that the trial attorneys’ statements, arguments, and questions to witnesses were not evidence to be considered. Thus, any potential error was cured by the trial court’s jury instructions.” And although the “victim” term arose with some frequency during the trial testimony, the court was unconvinced that these references “over the course of a six-day jury trial, which produced over 1,000 transcript pages, amounts to an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.” The court further noted that the jury found defendant was not guilty of AWIM “or its lesser included offenses, along with an array of related felony-firearm charges.” In light of this, his “argument that the repeated references to [C and K] as victims undermined his presumption of innocence is unavailing.” As to the limits on his cross-examination of C, even assuming that his “sought-after testimony was relevant, the trial court properly excluded it under MRE 403.” And he could not show that any alleged error was outcome-determinative.