Registration under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA); The SORA’s “recapture” provision; MCL 28.724(1); Motion to correct an invalid sentence; MCR 6.429(B); Conditions incident to a sentence; MCR 6.427(9); Retroactive application of SORA; People v Lee, People v Galloway, & People v Nunez; Ex post facto punishment; People v Betts & People v Lymon; The procedural requirements outlined in MCL 28.724(5); Mootness

On second remand from the Supreme Court, the court held that defendant could not be obligated to register under SORA and recommended that the Supreme Court dismiss his appeal as moot. He was convicted of OWI-III and possession of less than 25 grams of a controlled substance. As part of his probation, he was ordered to register as a sex offender under SORA’s “recapture” provision. In a prior appeal, the court disagreed with his contention that this amounted to an unconstitutional ex post facto punishment and affirmed. But the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for reconsideration in light of Betts. On remand, the court again affirmed the registration requirement. Before the Supreme Court could weigh in again, the prosecution moved for remand to the trial court to determine whether defendant could be required to comply with SORA. It noted he violated probation and was resentenced, but his new sentence did not reference SORA. He was subsequently released without ever registering. In response to the prosecution’s motion, he asserted “the Supreme Court should dismiss his appeal as moot because he cannot be required to comply with SORA.” The Supreme Court again remanded. The court now held that defendant “cannot be obligated to register under SORA under the facts of this case, which include that the [trial] court did not follow the appropriate procedures to require him to register under SORA, [it] did not place the registration requirement on the judgment of sentence, [he] never registered as a sex offender under SORA, he was discharged from his sentence nearly three years ago, the order of probation was revoked and no longer has any legal effect, and the time to amend the judgment of sentence has long expired.”