Denial of disability benefits & supplemental security income (SSI); “Disabled” under the Social Security Act; 42 USC § 423(a)(1)(E); The administrative law judge’s (ALJ) application of the analysis for assessing whether a claimant is disabled; 20 CFR § 404.1520(a)(4); Whether the claimant “can adjust to other work”; “Significant number” of available jobs in the national economy; Taskila v Commissioner of Soc Sec; Nejat v Commissioner of Soc Sec (Unpub 6th Cir); Whether there was “substantial evidence” supporting the ALJ’s decision; Biestek v Berryhill; Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD); Social Security Administration (SSA); Vocational expert (VE)

The court held that the ALJ did not err by denying plaintiff-Norris’s application for social security disability benefits and SSI because substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s finding that he could still perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy. Norris asserted that he was disabled and limited in his ability to work where he has “anxiety, depression, hereditary hemorrhagic telangiectasia, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, [PTSD], panic disorder, irritable bowel syndrome, migraines, and agoraphobia.” The SSA denied him benefits. After a hearing and expert testimony, the ALJ concluded that he was not disabled where he “could successfully adjust to other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy.” The Appeals Council denied his request for review. He then filed this action. The district court affirmed the ALJ’s ruling. Norris argued on appeal that the ALJ erred by finding there were a significant number of jobs open to him. He first claimed that the court had erred by previously finding what constituted a significant number of jobs. The court explained that it has never set a specific number, and that what “constitutes a significant number of jobs is determined case by case.” Norris argued that it did so in Taskila and Nejat and that those cases “erroneously conflated regional data with national data[.]” The court rejected this claim, and found that absent “any categorical rule setting the baseline number for a significant number of jobs, Taskila and Nejat do not dictate the outcome of this case.” As to his invitation to overrule Taskila, it noted among other things that his reliance on the Supreme Court’s decision in Biestek was misplaced. “Biestek does not establish a minimum number of jobs that must be available in the national economy, nor does it undermine this court’s holding in Taskila[.]” The court also rejected his attempt to impose a categorical threshold based on decisions in other circuits. And it concluded the ALJ applied the correct legal standard in considering the VE’s “testimony about the number of jobs in the national economy available to Norris.” A qualified VE’s testimony “may amount to substantial evidence. . . . The ALJ’s opinion discussed the [VE’s] testimony, including the jobs available to Norris; verified that the testimony was consistent with the information available in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles; and concluded this number was significant in the national economy.” Affirmed.