Parenting time; The law-of-the-case doctrine; Motion to suspend parenting time; MCL 722.27a(3); Limiting evidentiary hearing testimony; MRE 611; Proposed photo evidence; Makeup parenting time; MCL 552.642; Motion to modify child support; Order that a party undergo a psychological evaluation; MCL 722.27(1)(d)-(e); MCR 2.311(A); “Good cause”; Court-appointed experts; MRE 706; Contempt; Violation of a court order’s caregiver-notice & healthcare-notice provisions; Bond requirement; MCR 2.109(A); Frivolous-filing sanctions; MCR 1.109(E); MCL 600.2591; The seven-day procedure; MCR 2.602(B)(3); Attorney fees under MCR 3.206(D); Distinguishing Diez v Davey

In consolidated appeals, the court held that the trial court violated the law-of-the-case doctrine related to parenting time (PT). But it did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant-mother’s motion to suspend plaintiff-father’s PT or commit reversible error in awarding him 38 days of makeup PT. It also did not abuse its discretion in (1) denying defendant’s motion to modify child support, (2) ordering plaintiff to undergo a psychological evaluation, (3) finding him in contempt, or (4) “requiring the parties to post a $1,500 bond as a condition precedent to filing any additional motions or pleadings in the case.” The court rejected challenges to the trial court’s imposition of some frivolous-filing sanctions and denial of others. Finally, it did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant’s request for attorney fees “under MCR 3.206(D) based on an inability to bear the” litigation expense. The court noted that the case “has a complex trial and appellate history.” In this decision, among other things it agreed with defendant that the trial court abused its discretion in its 1/26/24 and 2/2/24 orders by requiring the parties’ child (ASK) “to travel one week per month from Florida to Michigan for parenting time with plaintiff.” The court vacated the parenting-time provisions of those trial court opinions and orders based on the law-of-the-case doctrine, noting that it “previously decided on three separate occasions that an order requiring ASK to bear the burden of travel is an abuse of discretion.” It found that the exception to the doctrine that “applies when the facts of the case have materially changed” did not apply here. It “remanded for further consideration of a parenting-time schedule that would not impose frequent travel burdens on the child.” As to sanctions, among other things it rejected plaintiff’s claim the trial court erred in finding that he “filed sanctionable objections to defendant’s seven-day order following” an emergency hearing. The trial court found that his objections were frivolous because (1) they did not comply with MCR 2.602(B)(3)(b) and (c)’s requirements; (2) they did not “state the inaccuracy or omission in the proposed order with specificity;” (3) they did not “raise the issue of the burden that defendant was to carry at the show-cause hearing; and (4) [he] failed to provide an alternative order for the [trial] court to consider.” The court agreed “with the trial court’s findings.” Vacated in part (as to the parenting-time schedule) and affirmed in all other respects. The court retained jurisdiction and issued an order as to the remand proceedings.