Search & seizure; Motion to suppress; “Reasonable suspicion” to stop defendant; United States v Gross; “Totality of the circumstances”; United States v McCallister

[This appeal was from the WD-MI.] The court held that police officers’ decision to stop defendant-Smith resulting in the recovery of a gun was based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity under the “totality of the circumstances.” He was charged with FIP. Smith argued that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop and frisk him. After a hearing, the district court ruled that the police could detain Smith where they “had a ‘reasonable suspicion that criminal activity, particularly an armed robbery or carjacking, was afoot,’ and that the frisk was lawful because, ‘[b]ased on the totality of the circumstances, the officers reasonably suspected Mr. Smith was armed and dangerous when they detained him.’” He entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving the right to appeal the suppression ruling. The court explained that a reasonable suspicion exists where, based on the totality of the circumstances, an “officer has ‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.’” It noted that this was “a low bar,” and found that it was met in this case. It concluded that an officer’s (W) “reasonable suspicion that Smith intended to carjack or rob him was supported by articulable facts and permissible inferences from those facts. First, and perhaps most important to our analysis, [W] made the ‘commonsense judgment[],’ . . . that Smith and his companions had come out of the stolen Chrysler.” He noted that the Chrysler had reappeared “at the scene twice before parking down the street, and he had previously observed [its] occupants watching him as the car passed by. [W] knew from his training and experience that stolen cars were often used in the commission of other offenses like carjackings and robberies.” In addition, Smith and his companions spread out as they walked toward his car, and each had a hand obscured. When W “drove away, the men immediately retreated towards the Chrysler.” The court added that this all “took place in a high-crime area that had seen previous carjackings, and [W’s] unmarked car was a model that was frequently stolen.” It held that the “totality of the circumstances gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that Smith and his companions intended to carjack or rob” W. It rejected Smith’s assertions that W’s beliefs were only a “hunch.” Affirmed.