Class certification; FedRCivP 23(b)(2) & (3); Claims under the Fair Housing Act (FHA); 42 USC § 3604; Rule 23(a)’s numerosity, commonality, typicality, & adequate representation requirements; Article III standing

The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by certifying a class (the Water Lien Class) under Rules 23(b)(2) and (3) in this challenge to defendant-City of Cleavland’s water lien assessments. It found that plaintiffs alleged a disparate-impact claim under § 3604 of the FHA that featured a common question and supported standing under Article III. Plaintiffs alleged that the City’s “‘disproportionate assessment of water liens on Black homeowners in Cuyahoga County, under [its] facially neutral water lien policy, violates the FHA.’” The court noted that statistics show “White residents make up approximately 59% of the population of Cuyahoga County, while Black residents make up 29%. Still, roughly 18% of water liens are placed in majority White neighborhoods, while 68% of water liens are placed in majority Black neighborhoods.” The court first reviewed the requirements for class certification under Rule 23(a)—numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate representation. It found that where plaintiffs “identified ‘at least 943 residents who would belong to the proposed’” class, there was a sufficient number. Further, they suffered “according to a common theory of injury under the FHA whose answer will resolve the suit ‘in one stroke’ for all members of the Class.” In addition, their “claims fairly encompass the claims of all unnamed class members.” Finally, they “established the adequacy of class representation because the named representatives share common interests with the unnamed interests of the Water Lien Class and appear able to ‘vigorously’ assert those interests for all.” The court also concluded that the class, “‘all Black homeowners or residents in Cuyahoga County’ who suffered the placement of a water lien within the past two years[,]” met the requirements of Rule 23(b)(2). And as to (b)(3), there was a “common question” at the center of the litigation. The court rejected the City’s standing argument, holding that plaintiffs “have standing to pursue their FHA claim on a disparate-impact theory, and questions of economic harm are irrelevant at this stage.” Affirmed.