Constitutionality of 25-year mandatory minimum sentence; Cruel & unusual punishment; De facto life sentence

The court concluded that defendant-Dupree had “not satisfied his burden of showing that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment or cruel or unusual punishment in violation of the federal or state constitutions.” He was convicted of armed robbery. Following a remand from the Supreme Court, he was resentenced as a fourth offense habitual offender to 25 years to 450 months. Dupree argued “that the 25-year mandatory minimum sentence required under MCL 769.12 is unconstitutional as applied to him because it constitutes cruel and/or unusual punishment.” Other than stating the existence of the circumstance, he did “not explain how they are ‘unusual.’” As a result, he had “failed to overcome the presumption of proportionality. Moreover, the 25-year mandatory minimum sentence is not unduly harsh under the circumstances surrounding Dupree and the offense that he perpetrated.” The court concluded that although he suggested “that his case was unusual because the trial court’s discretion was restrained, the record reflects that the [trial] court retained some discretion and, given the circumstances surrounding the offender, i.e., Dupree, it exercised that discretion in [his] favor.” He next argued “that his sentence constituted a de facto life sentence that are disproportionate to him and his offense.” He provided “a cursory citation to an article by the Council on Criminal Justice[.]” The court held that the article did not support his “assertion that there is no functional distinction between a 12-year sentence and a 25-year year sentence on deterrence. Rather, it indicates that the issue has not been well researched.” He next maintained “that the length of his sentence will do little to protect society[.]” He cited “an article by the National Institute of Justice.” Given that he “is a demonstrated man of violence and a chronic offender, the article suggests that the sentencing consideration of protection of society is actually better served by a longer period of incarceration.” Dupree contended “that the length of his sentence will deny him an opportunity to reveal his rehabilitation to the parole board.” Yet, the record reflected “that he has had multiple opportunities to demonstrate that he had been rehabilitated while in prison. And, despite being paroled on multiple occasion, [he] has continued to commit crimes. Indeed, he was on parole when he committed the offense at issue in this case. Regardless, the fact that he will not be before the parole board until he is 74 years of age does not deny him an opportunity to show rehabilitative potential.” Affirmed.