e-Journal Summary

e-Journal Number : 83829
Opinion Date : 06/11/2025
e-Journal Date : 06/13/2025
Court : Michigan Supreme Court
Case Name : Estate of McDuffie-Connor v. Neal
Practice Area(s) : Litigation Negligence & Intentional Tort
Judge(s) : Cavanagh, Welch, Bolden, and Thomas; Voting to deny leave – Zahra; Not participating – Bernstein and Hood
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Issues:

Auto negligence; Statutory owner liability; Wrongful death; Factual dispute over the operability of a vehicle’s turn signals; Comparative fault; Duty to anticipate that another driver would attempt to pass on the right; Distinguishing Briggs v Knapp; Sanctions for the spoliation of records

Summary

In an order in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the court vacated in part and reversed in part the Court of Appeals judgment (see eJournal # 81015 in the 2/21/24 edition), vacated the trial court’s order granting plaintiff’s motion for spoliation sanctions, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. The court held that the Court of Appeals erred in vacating “the trial court’s order denying defendant’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10). Genuine issues of material fact exist that must be resolved by a fact-finder.” The case arose from a fatal collision between the car driven by plaintiff’s decedent and the truck operated by defendant-Neal in the course of his employment with defendant-NSS Construction. The court concluded that “reasonable minds could differ on whether the truck’s turn signals were functioning properly at the time of the incident.” The court found that “the Court of Appeals majority improperly disregarded the findings of a post-collision investigation and, as a result, failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff as the nonmoving party.” The court further noted that “the factual dispute over the operability of the truck’s turn signals is material to plaintiff’s claims of negligence, statutory owner liability, and wrongful death.” In addition, it found that the trial court “correctly denied summary disposition on the issue of comparative fault.” And it disagreed “with defendant’s alternative argument for affirming the Court of Appeals—that Neal had no legal duty to anticipate that the decedent would attempt to pass on the right.” The court concluded that Briggs was distinguishable. “Unlike that case, reasonable minds could differ here on whether Neal should have perceived the decedent’s vehicle.” Whether that “vehicle should have been apparent to Neal as it approached on the right, and after Neal had passed the vehicle on the left seconds earlier, is a determination properly left to a fact-finder.” Because the trial court did not err in denying defendant’s summary disposition motion, the court reversed the Court of Appeals judgment to the contrary. As to plaintiff’s argument “that the Court of Appeals erred by vacating the trial court’s award of sanctions against defendant for the spoliation of” records, the court found that because “the trial court did not make the necessary findings to impose sanctions for the spoliation of employment and maintenance records, it was unnecessary for the Court of Appeals to resolve the merits of this issue.” Thus, it vacated “Parts II(A)(1), (2), and (3) of the Court of Appeals judgment, and” remanded for the “trial court to reconsider its ruling.”

Full PDF Opinion