Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to seek suppression of custodial statements; Miranda warnings; Miranda v Arizona; Principle that the Fourth Amendment’s fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree analysis does not apply to Miranda violations; Oregon v Elstad; Other acts evidence; MRE 404(b); Relevance; MRE 401; Unfair prejudice; MRE 403; Res gestae; People v Jakcson; Prosecutorial misconduct; References to a defendant’s post-arrest, post-Miranda silence; People v Shafier

The court held that defendant was not denied the effective assistance of counsel and the prosecution did not commit misconduct. He was convicted of second-degree murder, FIP, and felony-firearm in the death of the victim, whom he had been dating. On appeal, the court rejected his argument that he was “denied the effective assistance of trial counsel because counsel (1) failed to move to suppress the statements [he] made to the police, and (2) failed to object to certain evidence regarding his multiple sexual partners and out-of-wedlock children.” It noted that defendant made no argument “that the police’s failure to give Miranda warnings during the initial interview was the product of improper tactics or that [his] subsequent waiver of his rights and statements to the police were not knowing and voluntary.” As such, he failed to “show counsel performed deficiently in not seeking to suppress the statements he made at the police station. And even if counsel could have successfully sought suppression of [his] initial statements, [he] has failed to show any reasonable probability that, had those statements been suppressed, the result of his trial would have been any different.” As to the admission of evidence related to his sexual partners and out-of-wedlock children, it “was probative of what happened in the hours before the victim was shot, and why she may have been shot.” This evidence “was relevant both to defendant’s ‘motive,’ MRE 404(b)(1), and to the res gestae of the charged conduct.” And it was not unfairly prejudicial. The court also rejected his claim that the prosecutor “(1) improperly questioned a witness about [him] ending his second interview with the police to speak to a lawyer, and (2) made improper comments during closing arguments.” Although this line of questioning unduly suggested he should have continued to provide information instead of “remaining silent and requesting a lawyer, and did not make clear that [he] was within his constitutional rights to choose not to speak further with” the police, he failed to show relief was warranted as the “questioning and related comments were themselves fairly brief and isolated.” Moreover, there was “overwhelming, and untainted, circumstantial evidence of” his guilt. Affirmed.