Hearsay & the Confrontation Clause; Prejudice; Cumulative evidence; Ineffective assistance of counsel; Failure to object; Operating under the influence (OUI); Operating with license suspended or revoked (OWLS)

The court held that any error in the admission of testimony that defendant challenged as hearsay was not outcome determinative, and that his related ineffective assistance of counsel claim also failed due to the lack of prejudice. Thus, it affirmed his convictions of third-degree fleeing and eluding; felony-firearm (third offense); FIP; assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer; OUI; OWLS; and failure to stop after a collision. A 911 dispatcher (R) received a call from an individual (B) stating “that a Crown Victoria had hit his car at” a specified intersection and fled. B provided the other vehicle’s plate number and a description of the driver. Officer M responded to the call and spoke to B. M testified at trial about what B told him. Defendant argued that the trial court erred in allowing this testimony as it was inadmissible hearsay and violated his Confrontation Clause rights. The court concluded that, “assuming without deciding that it was plain error for the trial court to allow [M] to testify about what” B said to him, defendant was not prejudiced by the error. In B’s “911 call, the jury heard [B] say that the person in the Crown Victoria pointed a gun at him, and [R] confirmed that [B] told her during the call that a gun was pointed at him. [M’s] testimony that [B] told him that the perpetrator pointed a gun at him was thus cumulative to other evidence that was before the jury.” In addition, “there was strong untainted evidence supporting that defendant was aware of the firearm in his car, undermining his defense that he had no knowledge of [it]. Considering the weight and strength of the untainted evidence, combined with the fact that [M’s] disputed testimony was cumulative to other evidence that was before the jury (and to which defendant does not raise any objection),” the court concluded “that any error in the admission of [M’s] disputed testimony was not outcome determinative.” It also found that “there was not a reasonable probability that the outcome of defendant’s trial would have been different had defendant’s trial counsel objected to” M’s testimony.