Sentencing; Proportionate & reasonable; People v Stovall

The court found no merit in defendant’s claims “that the trial court did not undertake a careful assessment of the circumstances of this case, and that the sentence imposed was unreasonable[.]” It noted “that, as a result of the Supreme Court’s decision in Stovall, and the resentencing order entered by the trial court, defendant went from facing a life sentence for his second-degree murder conviction to a sentence that would make him eligible for parole approximately two years after resentencing.” Any suggestion by him “that he has been treated unreasonably in this matter rings hollow.” A jury convicted defendant, who was 17 years old at the time of the offenses, of second-degree murder; armed robbery; and felony-firearm. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of life with the possibility of parole for his murder conviction, 39 to 75 years for the armed robbery, and 32 to 48 months for the larceny, plus 2 years for his felony-firearm conviction, to run consecutively to his other sentences. Following Stovall, he was resentenced to concurrent terms of 24 to 45 years for second-degree murder, 15 to 24 years for armed robbery, and a consecutive 2-year term for felony-firearm. He claimed that his “sentence for second-degree murder was disproportionate to his circumstances and the offense.” He contended that the “guidelines did not consider [his] recent behavior in prison, [his] education achievements, or other positive factors.” This argument was not supported by the record. The court held that in “light of the trial court’s statements during resentencing, the record demonstrates that [it] appropriately balanced the seriousness of the offense, defendant’s conduct in custody, and [his] potential for rehabilitation.” Defendant did not show “that the trial court failed to consider relevant factors when resentencing him or that [it] improperly considered and balanced these factors when sentencing” him. He next argued “that his sentence was disproportionate and unreasonable because the sentencing guidelines range was too wide, leaving the trial court with no real guidance when sentencing” him. However, his guidelines range of 225 to 375 months was a result of his “criminal history and the nature of the offense.” The court held that the “trial court was authorized to impose a sentence that was within the range of 225 to 375 months as provided by MCL 777.61.” Finally, defendant argued “that the trial court lacked any guidance as to a ‘typical’ sentence for [his] second-degree murder conviction because comparable defendants in second-degree murder cases within Genesee County received significantly different sentences than he did.” But the circumstances of his “case are different from those of the five cases he uses to support his argument, and he cannot establish that these cases are ‘typical’ for purposes of his argument.” Thus, he did “not overcome the presumption that his within-guidelines sentence is proportionate and reasonable in light of [his] conduct in prison, [his] likelihood of rehabilitation, and the nature of the offense.” Affirmed.