e-Journal Summary

e-Journal Number : 83837
Opinion Date : 06/11/2025
e-Journal Date : 06/25/2025
Court : Michigan Court of Appeals
Case Name : People v. Klock
Practice Area(s) : Criminal Law
Judge(s) : Per Curiam – Boonstra, Redford, and Mariani
Full PDF Opinion
Issues:

Sufficiency of the evidence for CSC II convictions under MCL 750.520c(1)(a) & (b)(i); Acting for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or another sexual purpose; Objective, reasonable-person standard

Summary

The court held that there was sufficient evidence “for a reasonable jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification, or another sexual purpose” to support his CSC II convictions. The case arose from “the prolonged sexual abuse of KP, the victim, by her stepfather, defendant.” He argued on appeal that “his actions could not be reasonably considered grooming because his contact with KP never escalated to more serious sexual contact.” The court concluded that while he “presented alternative purposes for his conduct in his testimony, i.e., concern for her hygiene, it is still reasonable for a jury to infer from KP’s testimony that a stepfather who touches his stepdaughter’s intimate areas almost daily for several years, intrudes on her in the shower to touch her genitals, pressures her to kiss him, and comments on her breasts and buttocks does so because he has a sexual purpose.” The court noted that it “must make all credibility determinations in favor of the verdict.” It also determined that the record “supported that defendant’s behavior was consistent with grooming; [his] contact with KP escalated in frequency and sexual intrusion over time, particularly when he began feeling her genitals for unshaven hair. The fact that [he] never had an erection or stimulated himself while performing his acts does not preclude a reasonable jury from finding that he acted for sexual arousal or sexual gratification.” The court noted that “MCL 750.520(a)(q) does not require that sexual contact be for immediate sexual arousal or gratification. A reasonable jury could conclude that defendant acted for his own sexual arousal and gratification at a later time outside of KP’s presence. A reasonable jury could also conclude that [his] purpose was to gratify a sexual desire that was not physical.” Affirmed.

Full PDF Opinion