Alleged violation of a city ordinance prohibiting physically obstructing, resisting or hindering an officer in the discharge of their lawful duties; Failing to provide identification upon an officer’s request; People v Murawski; Stop under Terry v Ohio

Concluding that defendant’s conduct did not violate the city ordinance at issue, the court reversed and remanded with the instruction to dismiss the charge against her. The ordinance in question was East Lansing City Ordinance § 26-52(18). Defendant argued “that her conduct did not rise to the level of physical obstruction, resistance, or hindrance, and, therefore, she was not in violation of the ordinance.” The court’s “holding in Murawski indicates that a police officer may arrest an individual who refuses to provide identification during a Terry stop for the underlying offense, but not for the failure to provide identification alone. Obviously, disputing the amount of a bill with a vendor that provided goods and/or services was not a crime, i.e., it was not an underlying offense in this case.” Based on the record before the court, there “is no suggestion that defendant attempted to leave the restaurant without paying her bill, nor is there evidence of any other crime. There was simply a dispute between the hotel and a group of people that included defendant, i.e., a civil dispute between the people in the group and the establishment. Accordingly, defendant’s conduct of refusing to provide identification and allowing herself to be arrested did not rise to the level of physically obstructing, resisting, or hindering an officer in the discharge of their lawful duties because the command of requesting identification was not a command upon which the officer could lawfully arrest defendant, and it was not a command that would likely involve a physical confrontation if defendant refused to comply.” Finally, the court noted that “at the end of the prosecution’s brief on appeal, there is some brief discussion about the alleged potential consequences that may result from this Court ordering the trial court to dismiss the present case, which involves only a misdemeanor charge.” The brief noted that it was possible the police would seek to pursue a charge for violating MCL 750.81(d)(1), a felony. While the issue of whether she violated that statute was not before the court, it noted “that such a charge would be brought in direct defiance of the binding precedent set by this Court in Murawski, and thus, would clearly be improper.”