Appointment of a guardian of an incapacitated individual; MCL 700.5306(1); In re Guardianship of Malloy; “Incapacitated individual”; MCL 700.1105(a); Effect of an incapacitated person’s patient advocate designation (PAD); MCL 700.5306(2) & (5); Selection process under MCL 700.5313; Whether the requested person is “suitable & willing to serve”; MCL 700.5306a(1)(aa); Best interests; Durable power of attorney (DPOA)

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that the appointment of a guardian other than appellant-CY’s son (appellee-Jukowski) was vital to ensuring CY’s continuing care and supervision, by selecting a professional guardian, or by doing so despite the existence of CY’s PAD. Appellees-CY’s daughters successfully sought the appointment of a guardian of an incapacitated individual in the probate court. They alleged CY suffered from dementia and cognitive issues, and claimed Jukowski, as the self-appointed power of attorney, was not acting in her best interests. On appeal, the court rejected CY’s argument that the trial court had no basis to supplant Jukowski with a professional guardian. “The appointment of a guardian other than Jukowski was critical to ensure CY’s well-being because she lacked adequate nutrition, supervision, and hygiene while under [his] care.” The record showed “CY suffered from significant weight loss, she was unable to ask for food, she suffered from poor hygiene, including soiled diapers, and she had ‘eloped’ from her apartment on one occasion after Jukowski acquired powers as her patient advocate and medical DPOA.” Although he “described his withholding of CY’s medical information as a means of respecting” her privacy, her “‘health and well-being has declined to the extent that she requires around-the-clock care[,]’ indicating further involvement from the daughters mattered.” The court found the “trial court properly faulted Jukowski’s ‘laissez faire’ approach to CY’s care because she was a 93-year-old woman who was experiencing notable memory issues and cognitive decline.” Further, his decision to employ “an untrained 70-year-old man as CY’s primary caregiver was unwise in light of CY’s extensive ailments.” The court also rejected CY’s contention that the trial court abused its discretion by appointing a professional guardian without expressly stating whether it was in her best interests to do so. It found “the trial court explained how the appointment of a professional guardian was in CY’s best interests, [and] acted in accordance with MCL 700.5106(2)(a).” Finally, it rejected CY’s claim that the trial court appointed a professional guardian without adequately considering whether the PAD she signed sufficiently satisfied her needs. “[T]he statutory scheme for court-appointed guardianships contemplates that the trial court could appoint a person other than Jukowski to serve as the guardian for an ‘incapacitated person’ such as CY, even though” she made a PAD. Affirmed.