Fraud claims arising from a home sale; Claim for attorney fees; Sanctions for bringing a vexatious appeal; MCR 7.216(C)(1); Relief from judgment; MCR 2.612(C)(1)(b); South Macomb Disposal Auth v American Ins Co; People v Rogers; Evidentiary support for damages award; Fraudulent misrepresentation & silent fraud; Mercurio v Huntington Nat’l Bank; Motion for involuntary dismissal; MCR 2.504(B)(2); Application of the wrong standard; Harmless error; Right result; Admission of photo evidence; Authentication; MRE 901; Mitchell v Kalamazoo Anesthesiology, PC; Seller disclosure statement (SDS)

Because plaintiff failed to “properly advance her claim for attorney fees based on fraud committed by” defendant in the amended complaint, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying them. To the extent her request could be read as one “for attorney fees as exemplary relief for defendant’s ‘intentional and malicious actions,’” it still failed. The court also rejected her request for sanctions against defendant for a vexatious appeal. As to defendant’s cross-appeal, it held that the trial court did not clearly err in (1) “awarding plaintiff $35,000 in actual damages” or (2) finding “the elements of fraudulent misrepresentation and silent fraud were met[.]” And it did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion for relief from judgment or a new trial, or in admitting photo evidence. She also was not entitled to relief as to her involuntary dismissal motion. The case arose from defendant’s sale of a home to plaintiff. Plaintiff argued she was “entitled to attorney fees based on the trial court’s determination that defendant committed fraud.” The court and the Supreme Court “have recognized that attorney fees are permissible in limited situations where a party incurs legal expenses from another party’s fraudulent or unlawful conduct.” The court has also “held that to recover attorney fees as a form of damages, the party seeking such damages must have brought a claim for” them. Plaintiff failed to “specifically plead a claim for attorney fees based on fraud as she differentiated between exemplary damages and reasonable attorney fees in her request for relief. It was not until she moved to amend the judgment that she alleged that she was entitled to attorney fees based on the trial court’s conclusion that defendant had committed fraudulent misrepresentation and silent fraud, made in the judgment entered after trial.” Further, she did not assert, and there no evidence offered at trial, that she “suffered any form of humiliation, outrage, or indignity from defendant’s alleged failure to disclose flooding issues in the SDS before the” sale. As to defendant’s challenge to the damages award, the trial court “was permitted to use repair costs as a measure of damages in the context of misrepresentations related to the sale of real property, . . . and the testimony of the contractors provided a range within which to reach this number. The $35,000 amount was within this range. The trial court did not have to reach a number with mathematical precision, and its approximation was sufficient because a reasonable basis for the final amount existed.” Affirmed.