Floating homes ordinance; Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA); Governmental immunity; Governmental or proprietary function; Distinguishing Morgan Dev LLC v City of Detroit (Unpub); Breach of the Docks Clause & Representation Clause in a contract; Promissory estoppel; Breach of contract (BOC); Land Swap Agreement (LSA)

In Docket No. 367059, the court reversed the trial court’s order finding that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether defendant-City was engaged in a governmental or proprietary function. The City was entitled to immunity on plaintiff’s (collectively, Dune Ridge) Counts IV, V, VI and IX. In Docket No. 367078, it affirmed “the trial court’s orders granting the City’s BOC Motion and Promissory Estoppel Motion and the trial court’s orders denying Dune Ridge’s BOC Motion and Ordinance Motion.” Dune Ridge entered into an agreement with the “City to swap parcels of land located along the Kalamazoo River. Though not expressed in the agreement itself, Dune Ridge planned to develop its resulting parcel into a high-end floating homes rental business. The Saugatuck City Council (City Council), however, subsequently enacted several ordinances regulating the use of floating homes, which disrupted Dune Ridge’s plans.” The City argued, among other things, “that the trial court erred by denying its Immunity Motion because there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the City’s entitlement to governmental immunity as to Dune Ridge’s tort claims.” First, the court agreed “with the City that there is no genuine issue of material fact that the City was engaged in a governmental function when the alleged torts occurred, and the trial court erred by concluding otherwise.” There was “no genuine issue of material fact that the City was authorized to enter into the LSA and therefore was engaged in a governmental function when the alleged torts occurred. Accordingly, the trial court erred by denying the City’s Immunity Motion on this basis.” The court concluded that the “trial court also erred by finding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the City was engaged in a proprietary function.” The court found “no merit in Dune Ridge’s argument that the property exchange was commercial in nature or that there is otherwise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the City’s primary purpose was to produce a pecuniary profit. Accordingly, the trial court also erred by denying the City’s Immunity Motion on this ground.” Reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.