Whether a county’s legislative branch has authority to require its executive branch to provide digital real-time, read-only access to financial information it deems necessary for budgeting; The Uniform Budgeting & Accounting Act (UBAA); County Ordinance 2017-04, § 10(H); County Charter, § 3.5(a); County budgeting requirements & responsibilities; Whether the term “law” in the County Charter encompasses ordinances validly enacted by the Commission; “Law” & “ordinance”; Clam Lake Twp v Department of Licensing & Regulatory Affairs

Holding that the County’s Charter gives defendant-County Commission legal authority to require plaintiff-County Executive to provide access to digital real-time, read-only access to financial information it deems necessary for budgeting, the court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded to the trial court. In its counterclaim, defendant sought declaratory relief and a writ of mandamus ordering plaintiff to comply with the UBAA, the County Charter, and a County ordinance by granting real-time, read-only access to the county’s financial management software to the Commission’s director of legislative affairs. The trial court ultimately denied defendant’s motion and dismissed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The court disagreed with the Court of Appeals. “When concluding that the County Executive’s supervisory power could not be limited in any way by an ordinance passed by the Commission, the Court of Appeals failed to give the proper meaning to Charter, § 3.5(a). The majority’s analysis failed to consider relevant context and principles of statutory interpretation and thus failed to respect the status of county ordinances as binding ‘law’ within the county.” The court concluded that “Ordinance 2017-04, § 10(H) was validly adopted as a law within” the county. It “imposes a degree of restriction upon the County Executive’s control over the county’s information technology and finance departments.” Charter, § 3.5(a) “permits such restriction if it is accomplished by the ‘Charter or law’ and does not create a conflict between the ordinance and the Charter. Nothing in Charter, § 3.5 clearly indicates that ‘law’ was intended to be so narrow as to exclude validly enacted ordinances.” As such, “after its adoption Ordinance No. 2017-04, § 10(H) was effective and enforceable absent a clear conflict with a Charter provision other than § 3.5(a) or a superior form of law.” Although the parties disagreed about the meaning of Charter, § 3.5(a), neither party suggested the ordinance was “otherwise in conflict with or preempted by another Charter provision or a state law. Section 3.5(b) of the Charter further implies that the County Executive has some form of a legal duty to enforce Ordinance 2017-04, § 10(H), irrespective of whether the ordinance requires more of the County Executive than the UBAA or Charter, § 8.6.1.” Thus, the court held that “the plain language of Ordinance 2017-04, § 10(H) requires the County Executive to provide the Commission or its agent with access to real-time, read-only access to financial software programs used by the county.” This conclusion made it unnecessary for the court “to address whether Charter, § 8.6.1 separately imposes such a requirement.”