e-Journal Summary

e-Journal Number : 83876
Opinion Date : 06/20/2025
e-Journal Date : 07/02/2025
Court : Michigan Court of Appeals
Case Name : Gupton v. Gupton
Practice Area(s) : Family Law Litigation
Judge(s) : Per Curiam – Maldonado, M.J. Kelly, and Riordan
Full PDF Opinion
Issues:

Custody; Counsel in a child custody proceeding; A civil litigant’s lack of representation; The trial court’s refusal to adjourn an evidentiary hearing pursuant to MCR 2.503(D)(1); The Child Custody Act (CCA)

Summary

The court found that even if defendant-mother “was entitled to counsel in the child custody proceeding, she” failed to show she was entitled to relief. It also concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying her oral motion to adjourn the third day of the evidentiary hearing. Thus, the court affirmed the divorce judgment, which awarded plaintiff-father sole legal and physical custody of the parties’ children. Defendant asserted “she was deprived of her right to counsel when she was forced to proceed, in propria persona, in the midst of the evidentiary hearing after the trial court discharged” her attorney upon her request. The court noted that Michigan “courts have not explicitly recognized a parental right to counsel in child custody or guardianship proceedings.” But it has found “that a civil litigant’s lack of representation may entitle the party to legal recourse.” In this case, defendant “elected to discharge her counsel during an evidentiary hearing, and did not acquire substitute counsel for the remainder of the litigation. As [she] essentially deprived herself of her presumed right to counsel, she is not entitled to relief.” As to the denial of her motion to adjourn, “the trial court was within its discretion to find that defendant had not exercised due diligence in attempting to obtain alternate counsel before the evidentiary hearing and in failing to request an adjournment until the date and time set for the third hearing.” In addition, she failed “to indicate exactly what evidence was pertinent to the underlying matter that alternate counsel would have presented on her behalf.” The court also found that it was “not evident that an adjournment permitting [her] to retain alternate counsel would have yielded a different outcome. The trial court extensively relied on defendant’s own testimony and her conduct throughout the proceedings to determine her fitness as a parent and to resolve the majority of the best-interest factors.” The court also noted that the CCA “permits a trial court to ‘modify or amend its previous judgments or orders for proper cause shown or because of change of circumstances,’ as long as the modification would be in the child’s best interests[.]” Defendant is able to file such a motion with new counsel’s assistance. The trial court’s ruling “fell within the range of principled outcomes.”

Full PDF Opinion