Pre-amendment version of MCR 2.403(O) allowing recovery case-evaluation sanctions; Reitmeyer v Schultz Equip & Parts Co, Inc; RAD Constr, Inc v Davis (overruled in part by Webster v Osguthorpe); “Injustice” exception to MCR 1.102; Uninsured motorist (UM) benefits

Concluding that “the trial court’s determination did not constitute an abuse of discretion in the circumstances of this case,” the court affirmed the order granting plaintiff-Grant’s motion for case-evaluation sanctions under former MCR 2.403(O). He was injured in a motor-vehicle accident. He filed this breach-of-contract action against defendants-Auto Owners and Home Owners (collectively Auto Owners) seeking UM benefits. A jury rendered a verdict in his favor. On appeal, Auto Owners challenged “the trial court’s decision to apply former MCR 2.403(O) and award case-evaluation sanctions rather than the amended court rule, which does not provide for case-evaluation sanctions.” Auto Owners primarily relied on RAD Constr and argued that this case required the same result. It asserted “that, as in RAD Constr, the trial court in this case lacked authority to impose case-evaluation sanctions. After the parties filed their briefs on appeal in this case, and this Court heard oral argument,” the Supreme Court decided Webster, in which it overruled RAD Constr in that regard. Thus, the court held that “Auto Owners’s reliance on RAD Constr for the proposition that the trial court lacked authority to apply the former rule is unavailing.” Further, as stated in Reitmeyer, “whether the ‘injustice’ exception to MCR 1.102 applies is to be determined on a case-by-case basis.” The court examined the facts and circumstances in this “case in reviewing the trial court’s decision to apply the old rule” here. It found that “the trial court record does not include the full transcript; only the transcript of Grant’s motion for case-evaluation sanctions is included in the record. Without the jury-trial transcript, or an alternative trial court filing that details Grant’s injuries and sensibilities as well as the nature of the incident, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by determining that those factors warranted application of the former court rule.” The court noted that in “addition to those factors, the trial court reasoned that the former court rule had been in effect during much of the lower court proceedings and that Grant’s attorney agreed to substitute for previous counsel because case-evaluation sanctions were available at the time that he substituted in” this case. The court found that the “trial court properly relied on factors set forth in Reitmeyer—including timing, gamesmanship, and reliance—in deciding whether applying the new rule would work an injustice.”