Motion to vacate convictions; Whether the admission of subsequently suppressed evidence was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; People v Anderson

Holding that the admission of subsequently suppressed evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, the court reversed the trial court’s denial of defendant-Chapel’s motion to vacate his convictions, and remanded for a new trial. He was convicted of first-degree premediated murder, conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, discharge of a firearm from a vehicle causing death, discharge of a firearm at a building causing death, AWIM, discharge of a firearm at an occupied building, and felony-firearm. The court previously “remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing related to the search and seizure of” his cell phone. On remand, the trial court found that the evidence found on his phone “was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment and so it suppressed the evidence.” But it denied his motion to vacate his convictions because it “determined that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt[.]” But on appeal, the court found that “the suppressed evidence was the strongest and most compelling evidence linking Chapel to his phone. It was also the strongest and most direct evidence indicating that he had traveled a direct route from Grayton Street to Nashville Street in a moving vehicle, that the vehicle stopped on Nashville Street, and that he then traveled on a direct route back to Grayton Street.” A witness’s “cell tower analysis did not come close to this level of specificity and, by his own admission, was incapable of providing such a specific location analysis. Additionally, the suppressed evidence was the only evidence that Chapel had access to a gun that was consistent with at least one of the guns used in the shooting and that he had searched eleven times for news articles related to the shooting. And, given that the prosecution relied heavily upon the suppressed evidence in her closing and rebuttal argument, we cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that there is no reasonable possibility that the suppressed evidence may have contributed to Chapel’s convictions.”