Expert testimony; MRE 702; Jury composition; Fair cross-section requirement; The absolute-disparity test; Systematic exclusion; Motion for judicial disqualification; MCR 2.003(C)(1); Motions for a mistrial; Sentencing; Proportionality; Consecutive sentencing; MCL 750.520b(3); Assault with intent to commit criminal sexual penetration (AWICSP)

The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted expert testimony. It rejected defendant’s jury composition challenge. He also did not meet his burden of overcoming the heavy presumption of impartiality as to judicial disqualification. Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motions for a mistrial. There was no merit in “his challenge to the proportionality of his sentences, which were the statutory minimum prison terms that the trial court could impose[.]” Finally, “the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it exercised the discretion afforded by our Legislature to impose consecutive sentences.” He was convicted of CSC I, CSC II, and AWICSP. He was sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender to “a minimum prison term of 25 years on each count of conviction. The trial court also ordered the” CSC I prison term to run consecutive to the term for AWICSP. Defendant asserted, among other things, that prosecution expert-C “was not qualified to furnish expert testimony, and that the expert testimony from [C] crossed several lines established by MRE 702 and a pretrial order.” The court held that the “trial court made all of the findings required under MRE 702 to qualify an expert witness, and then stated that ‘[t]he credibility of every witness, including an expert, is in the hands of the capable jury.’ The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it qualified [C] as an expert witness.” While defendant persuasively argued that C’s “expert testimony in numerous other cases has been declared improper, no prior case in this Court or our Supreme Court has resulted in a ruling that [C] is not qualified to provide expert testimony.” The court found that C’s “expert testimony has caused serious problems in numerous prior cases. but the trial court acted within its discretion when it permitted him to testify, just as more than 300 other trial courts have chosen to do.” Also, defendant did not establish that the plain error the court found in part of C’s testimony “affected his substantial rights, so he” failed to show that reversal was warranted. Finally, to the extent that a portion of C’s “expert testimony was improper because it did not meet the requirements of MRE 702 or it violated the pretrial order’s prohibition on describing ‘factual scenarios in which children are more likely to fabricate allegations of sexual assault,’ it was defense counsel who raised the factual scenarios. Thus, defendant has not established that plain error occurred in that regard.” He also did not satisfy the second and third prongs of his fair cross-section claim. Affirmed.