Nuisance per se claim related to a wood processing business; MCL 125.3407; Alleged zoning ordinance violation; The Right to Forest Act; MCL 320.2034(1); “Forestry” (MCL 320.2033(d)); “Generally accepted forestry management practices” (MCL 320.2033(e)); Grant of a motion for partial summary disposition based on a limited factual record; North American Industry Classification System (NAICS)

The court held that the trial court did not err in granting plaintiffs-Bloemkers partial summary disposition on their nuisance per se claim “based on the factual record before it.” The trial court was correct that the “motion presented an issue of law fit for adjudication through summary disposition.” It also did not err in ruling that defendants-Dumonts’ actions did not constitute “forestry” and violated the local zoning ordinance (ZO). The trial court found as to the nuisance per se claim “that processing timber into firewood and then selling the firewood is not ‘forestry’ under the” ZO. The court concluded that defendants “failed to present any argument or evidence to the trial court that demonstrated a deficiency fatal to the Bloemkers’ motion or the existence of a genuine issue of material fact.” And it held that summary disposition for plaintiffs was proper. The trial court primarily considered the ZO and the Right to Forest Act “in determining whether the Dumonts have the right to conduct their wood processing operation on their property[.]” The parties’ properties are within the ZO’s Rural Conservation District. The inquiry was whether defendants’ activities constituted “forestry.” The court found that they did not “create a genuine factual dispute as to their use of machinery on their property to convert timber into firewood.” Although the ZO’s plain language “did not define ‘forestry,’ it expressly incorporated by reference the definition provided by the NAICS, which is not ambiguous as to what constitutes forestry. Under its plain language, the NAICS does not contemplate the activities at issue within” that definition. Further, “reviewing the Right to Forest Act, the trial court found that the plain definition of forestry provided in that statute also did not include the activities at issue here. The trial court’s interpretation of these provisions was proper, as was its application of them to the record before it. . . . [T]he trial court acknowledged the limited record and lack of factual development presented by both parties, and correctly concluded it was nonetheless equipped to grant partial summary disposition on the legal issue before it without needing additional facts.” The court found no error in its “method of statutory interpretation and its award of summary disposition to” plaintiffs. Affirmed.