Federal preemption; The Federal Aviation Administration & Authorization Act (FAAAA or the Act); 49 USC § 14501(c); Whether the FAAAA preempts state common law “negligent hiring” claims against freight brokers; The FAAAA’s safety exception; § 14501(c)(2)(A); City of Columbus v Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv, Inc; Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc v Pelkey; Whether common-law tort claims like plaintiff’s negligent hiring claim are part of a state’s “safety regulatory authority”; Whether negligent hiring claims are “with respect to motor vehicles”

In an issue of first impression in this circuit, the court considered whether the FAAAA preempts negligent hiring claims against freight brokers under a state’s common law. It held that where such a claim “substantively concerns motor vehicles and motor vehicle safety,” it falls within the FAAAA’s safety exception and is not preempted. Plaintiff-Cox sued defendant-TQL, a freight broker, for negligence under Ohio law. He alleged that TQL negligently hired an “unsafe motor carrier,” resulting in his wife’s death in a vehicle accident. The district court dismissed the case, ruling that it was preempted by the FAAAA. On appeal, Cox conceded that § 14501(c)(1) prohibited his state-law claim but argued that the Act’s safety exception saved it from preemption. Agreeing that the claim fell within the scope of § 14501(c)(1), the court turned to the applicability of the safety exception, The exception provides that the FAAAA “‘shall not restrict the safety regulatory authority of a State with respect to motor vehicles . . . .’” The court held that common-law tort claims like Cox’s negligent-hiring claim are part of a state’s “safety regulatory authority,” satisfying the first prong of § 14501(c)(2)(A). It then considered whether negligent hiring claims such as Cox’s are “with respect to motor vehicles.” This was the requirement in dispute here and is the source of a circuit court split. The court explained that in the present case, it was not necessary to decide “whether the safety exception requires a direct connection to motor vehicles” because even if this was required, Cox’s claim would not be preempted. On this point, the court diverged from the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits. And the court found that Cox's theory of liability – that TQL was liable for ignoring a motor vehicle operation record and placing a vehicle driven by an unsafe driver on the highway – “comports with the FAAAA’s recognition that motor vehicles are core to the services provided by brokers, as well as the basic reality that brokers are ultimately responsible for placing such motor vehicles on the road, even if those motor vehicles are driven and owned by a different entity.” The common law requirement Cox sought “to enforce would, in turn, directly regulate a broker’s sale, provision, and arrangement of motor vehicle transportation. Assuming that a direct link between Mr. Cox’s substantive claim and motor vehicles is indeed required, we conclude that such a link exists here.” The court held that Cox’s claim fell “within the ambit of the safety exception.” Reversed and remanded.