Statute of limitations applicable to felony-firearm; Catchall six-year statute of limitations for criminal indictments; MCL 767.24(10); Plain-error review; Admission of a recorded prison conversation; Fifth Amendments right against self-incrimination; Coercion; Applicability of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel; Polygraph reference; Evidence of other acts of domestic violence; MCL 768.27b; MRE 403; Sentencing; Jail credit; MCL 769.11b; Judgment of sentence (JOS)

Noting that the statute of limitations applicable “to felony-firearm appears to be an issue of first impression,” the court held that felony-firearm is subject to the 6-year catchall limitations period in MCL 767.24(10). It also concluded “that, under the circumstances, the error of not dismissing that count because it was time-barred was plain.” But it held that defendant’s evidentiary and constitutional arguments lacked merit. Thus, it affirmed his second-degree-murder conviction but under plain-error review vacated his felony-firearm conviction. It remanded for the trial court to dismiss that conviction, provide him “with an opportunity to establish any jail credit to which he is entitled, and correct his” JOS. His convictions arose from the shooting death of T in 2010, but he was not charged in this case until 2021. The prosecution contended “that felony-firearm should not be subject to its own limitations period but should be subject to the same limitations period as the predicate felony.” The court rejected “this argument because, while charging an individual with felony-firearm depends on the existence of a predicate felony or attempted felony, felony-firearm is a crime distinct from the underlying felony or attempted felony.” It believed “that, because there is no statute specifying that any other limitations period applies, felony-firearm must be subject to the catchall limitations period of six years in MCL 767.24(10). And because defendant was not charged with” felony-firearm within that “period, the charge was time-barred” and should have been dismissed. The court found that the conclusion the “six-year statute of limitations in MCL 767.24(10) applies to defendant’s felony-firearm prosecution ‘is not subject to reasonable dispute,’ so the error of allowing that count to stand was plain.” Further, it was “obvious that defendant was prejudiced by this plain error.” As to whether he was entitled to jail credit, the prosecution conceded that he was not on parole when T “was murdered, so his parole status should not have precluded him from receiving any jail credit to which he was entitled.” The court rejected defendant’s challenge to the admission of a recorded conversation between his then-girlfriend-H (who has passed away) and defendant on the basis that it was obtained in violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. While the police used H “to deceive defendant and ‘lull him into a false sense of security,’” the court held that “nothing about this deception or the circumstances surrounding defendant’s conversation with [H] compelled or coerced [him] to talk to her. It follows that Miranda warnings were not required, and [his] Fifth Amendments right against self-incrimination was not violated.” The court also held that, when he spoke to H, “he did not yet have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel as it relates to [T’s] murder, so that right could not have been violated.” His other evidentiary challenges also failed.