Waiver of jury trial; Knowing, voluntary, & intelligent; People v Lafey; Evidentiary hearing on a motion to suppress evidence; People v Kaufman

The court concluded that defendant failed to show “the circumstances of this case rebut the presumption that” his jury trial “waiver was knowing and voluntary.” Also, because “the parties stipulated to the trial court resolving the motion” to suppress based on review of the preliminary exam “record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to” conduct an evidentiary hearing on the motion. He was convicted of assault with a dangerous weapon, assaulting, resisting, and obstructing a police officer, FIP of ammunition, and felony-firearm. Defendant argued that his jury trial “waiver was inadequate because the trial court failed to explain that a jury verdict must be reached unanimously, or to inquire in greater detail whether [he] understood the nature of a jury trial.” However, he did “not point to authority that requires the trial court to inquire or explain more specifically than directed by MCR 6.402(B) when determining whether the defendant’s waiver of the right to a jury trial was knowingly and voluntarily made. Rather, . . . when a trial court complies with the directives of MCR 6.402(B), a presumption is created that a defendant’s waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” Here, the “waiver was conducted in open court, the trial court advised defendant of his right to trial by jury, the trial court addressed defendant personally to determine whether defendant understood his right to a jury trial, defendant stated that he was choosing voluntarily to give up that right and to be tried by the court, and a verbatim record of the waiver proceeding was made.” Thus, the court presumed that he “understood his right to a jury trial and waived that right knowingly and voluntarily absent evidence to the contrary.” Affirmed.