Termination under §§ 19b(3)(c)(i) & (j); Children’s best interests; In re Olive/Metts; Effect of relative placement; In re Gonzales/Martinez

Holding that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that §§ (c)(i) and (j) were established and that termination was in the children’s best interests, the court affirmed the order terminating respondent-mother’s parental rights. As to § (c)(i), 534 days elapsed between the initial dispositional order and the start of the termination trial. And the court concluded the “trial court did not clearly err by finding that the conditions leading to the adjudication continued to exist.” Respondent’s assertion “that no new issues of improper supervision, i.e., exposing the children to domestic violence, arose” lacked merit because § (c)(i) “requires only that the conditions leading to adjudication ‘continue to exist,’ not that new specific instances must occur.” The record also supported that she “did not rectify the condition of domestic violence because she continued to engage with” the father of two of the children (R and N), with whom she had a history of domestic violence, despite participating in domestic violence counseling. And while she contended “the other conditions leading to adjudication, including parenting skills, unemployment, and housing insecurity, were” rectified, the record reflected that she “did not maintain consistent employment or obtain stable housing for the pendency of the case.” As to her “parenting skills, the caseworker did not see any improvement after respondent completed a 10-week parenting class.” Turning to § (j), the court concluded that her “behavior in choosing to reside with [R and N’s] father placed the children at continued risk of physical and emotional harm.” As to the children’s best interests, the court held that “the trial court did not clearly err by finding that terminating respondent’s parental rights to 4 of” them was in their best interests. It “determined that termination was not in the best interests of the other six children because they were safely placed with their fathers, whereas that was not the case with” the four children at issue on appeal. R and N were two months old when removed “and spent the majority of their lives in foster care to the extent that they called their caregiver ‘mom’ and did not recognize respondent.” The trial court also did not err as to the other two children, given their age, the length of time they had been out of “respondent’s care, the lack of progress” she made on her reunification barriers, and their strong bond with their caregivers.