Action under 42 USC § 1983; Malicious prosecution; “Probable cause”; Whether the exclusionary rule & fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine apply in § 1983 cases; Fabrication of evidence; Untimely claims for unlawful search & seizure, selective enforcement, & false imprisonment; Municipal liability claim; Monell v Department of Soc Servs

The court held as to plaintiff-Codrington’s claim of fabrication of evidence under § 1983 that he raised a genuine dispute whether the police fabricated evidence that was used to charge him with crimes. As to his malicious prosecution claim, in an issue of first impression in this circuit, it joined its sister circuits by holding that the exclusionary rule and fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine do not apply in § 1983 cases. Codrington was subjected to an illegal traffic stop. The illegally seized evidence was suppressed and the criminal proceedings dropped. Three years later, he sued under § 1983. The district court granted defendants summary judgment on all claims. The court first held that the applicable state statute of limitations barred Codrington’s unlawful-search-and-seizure, selective-enforcement, and false-arrest/imprisonment claims. But his claims for malicious prosecution and fabrication of evidence were not untimely. As to the malicious prosecution claim, the court found that, putting “aside the questions of fact regarding the allegedly fabricated evidence, the undisputed facts established probable cause for the officers to arrest and charge Codrington with possession of marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia while possessing a firearm.” The court considered whether the illegal search and seizure precluded it from considering the illegally obtained evidence. As it held that the exclusionary rule and fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree doctrine apply only in criminal matters, the court was able to consider “the indisputably non-fabricated evidence found in Codrington’s vehicle[.]” Thus, it could “rely upon the small amount of marijuana, marijuana grinder, and legal firearm seized from the vehicle to determine whether defendants had probable cause to arrest Codrington. Plainly, they did.” Thus, the court held that defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the malicious prosecution claim. But it concluded that he raised a genuine dispute of material fact as to his fabrication of evidence claim. The traffic stop appeared “pretextual,” and the bodycam footage did not show the actions that were critical to the officers’ claims about Codrington’s suspicious actions, such as attempting to place something into the center console. A photo the officers submitted to the prosecutor contained a gun and ammunition magazines that did not belong to Codrington. “At the very least, there is a question of fact as to what role the fabricated evidence played in the prosecutor’s charging decision.” Further, given its reversal of the district court’s ruling on the fabrication-of-evidence claim, the court also vacated its Monell conclusions and remanded for consideration of the merits. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded.