Subject-matter jurisdiction over appellant’s petition for a contested case hearing; Natural Resources & Environmental Protection Act (NREPA); MCL 324.30110(2) & 324.30319(2); Whether the action or inaction forming the basis for the petition must relate to a permit application; Statutory interpretation; Administrative law judge (ALJ); Department of Environment, Great Lakes, & Energy (EGLE)

The court reversed “the rulings of the ALJ and circuit court to the extent that they held that the ALJ lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over appellant’s petition as it” related to NREPA Parts 301 and 303 because neither MCL 324.30110(2) nor “324.30319(2) require the filing of a permit application under Part 301 or Part 303 to be invoked.” Appellant contended “that the ALJ and the circuit court erred by adding a requirement to the texts of MCL 324.30110(2) and MCL 324.30319(2); it contends that both statutes state that a person ‘aggrieved by any action or inaction of the department’ may ‘request a formal hearing on the matter involved,’ and do not say that the action or inaction must relate to a permit application.” The court agreed, concluding “the statutes plainly do not say anything about a permit application, so the ALJ and circuit court erred by adding that requirement to the statutes. MCL 324.30110(2) and MCL 324.30319(2) both simply state that a person aggrieved by an action or inaction of the department may request a hearing. These statutes therefore granted the ALJ subject-matter jurisdiction to hear appellant’s petition to the extent that the petition involved matters related to Parts 301 and 303.” The court noted that the “language ‘any action or inaction of the department’ is broad, . . . and nothing about the statutes’ language suggests that the statutes only apply when the department acts or fails to act with respect to a permit application.” This conclusion was “reinforced by the fact that, as appellant rightly notes, other sections in different parts of the NREPA explicitly limit contested case proceedings to actions that the department takes with respect to a permit or an application for a permit.” The court concluded “that MCL 324.30110(2) and MCL 324.30319(2) are not limited to the department’s ‘action or inaction’ with respect to a permit or an application for a permit under Part 301 or Part 303. The ALJ and the circuit court erred by adding this requirement to these statutes.” However, the court found that “the ALJ and circuit court did not err by recognizing that there must be some limit on the ‘any action or inaction’ language of MCL 324.30110(2) and” 324.30319(2). Thus, reading it in context, the court held “that the language ‘any action or inaction of the department’ as used in MCL 324.30110(2) and MCL 324.30319(2) is limited to the action or inaction of the EGLE with respect to Part 301 and Part 303, respectively.” It emphasized that its “ruling is a narrow one.” The ALJ was free on remand “to address any of the parties’ remaining disputes, including whether appellant is ‘aggrieved,’ whether a hearing is required, and what relief, if any, is available.” Remanded.